{ "_meta": { "schema_version": "1.5", "generated": "2026-05-02", "description": "Apocalypse Clock parameter dataset with explicit growth-calibration metadata. Each '.growth_rate' entry now distinguishes raw indicator growth from effective systemic risk-growth.", "parameter_count_excluding_meta": 184, "threat_count": 23, "metrics_per_threat": 8, "threats": [ "ai", "amr", "authoritarian", "autonomousw", "biodiversity", "bioengineered", "climate", "cyber", "debt", "displacement", "economic", "epistemic", "fragmentation_gov", "geopolitics", "minerals", "nuclear", "oceans", "pandemics", "pollution", "soils", "space", "supply", "water" ], "metrics": [ "acceleration", "gov_failure", "growth_rate", "interdependence", "irreversibility", "scale", "threshold", "urgency" ], "entry_fields": [ "mu", "lo", "hi", "source", "url", "accessed", "strength", "note", "growth_kind", "risk_conversion", "raw_indicator_growth", "effective_growth_calibrated", "calibration_note" ], "dimensions": { "scale": { "range": [0, 5], "unit": "normalized ordinal score", "meaning": "Estimated potential systemic magnitude of harm if the threat intensifies." }, "urgency": { "range": [0, 5], "unit": "normalized ordinal score", "meaning": "Near-term priority: how much the threat already requires action in the present decade." }, "acceleration": { "range": [0, 5], "unit": "normalized ordinal score", "meaning": "Observed or plausibly inferred rate of worsening in drivers, exposure, capability, or impacts." }, "interdependence": { "range": [0, 5], "unit": "normalized ordinal score", "meaning": "Degree to which the threat couples to, amplifies, or is amplified by other systemic threats." }, "irreversibility": { "range": [0, 5], "unit": "normalized ordinal score", "meaning": "Persistence of damage and difficulty of recovery once the threat crosses damaging states." }, "gov_failure": { "range": [0, 5], "unit": "normalized ordinal score", "meaning": "Risk that governance, institutions, or collective action fail to prevent or contain the threat." }, "growth_rate": { "range": "dimension-specific, not 0–5", "unit": "annualized proxy growth rate", "meaning": "Usually an annual fractional growth rate where 0.02 means about 2% per year. Some entries use a domain-specific proxy when the underlying phenomenon is not naturally fractional; the note field must be read for interpretation. For example, AI may use frontier-compute scaling rather than a direct risk score. For oceans, this is explicitly a composite pressure proxy rather than a pure acidification or pH series." }, "threshold": { "range": [0, 10], "unit": "normalized destabilization threshold", "meaning": "Abstract model threshold for systemic destabilization; not comparable as a 0–5 severity score. Values are calibrated against dashboard anchors such as climate, nuclear conflict, and global governance failure." } }, "strength_values": { "strong": "Direct support from a high-quality source or closely matched quantitative evidence.", "moderate": "Reasonable support from credible sources, but with non-trivial uncertainty or indirect mapping.", "weak": "Limited, proxy, very small-sample, commercial, or otherwise lower-confidence evidence.", "expert_judgment": "Expert judgment without a direct URL anchor in the entry.", "anchored_judgment": "Expert judgment calibrated to one or more named/linked source anchors; used when the numeric mapping is inferential but the conceptual anchor is explicit." }, "calibration_method": "For growth_rate entries, empirical indicator/proxy growth is mapped to effective systemic risk-growth using min(log1p(raw_indicator_growth) × conversion_multiplier, cap). This is a compatibility-layer calibration, not a new empirical claim.", "growth_rate_calibration_classes": { "ai": {"growth_kind": "capability_growth", "conversion_multiplier": 0.025, "cap": 0.04}, "cyber": {"growth_kind": "incident_reporting_growth", "conversion_multiplier": 0.055, "cap": 0.045}, "fragmentation_gov": {"growth_kind": "small_count_institutional_proxy", "conversion_multiplier": 0.1, "cap": 0.04}, "space": {"growth_kind": "inventory_growth_proxy", "conversion_multiplier": 0.18, "cap": 0.04}, "epistemic": {"growth_kind": "institutional_spread_proxy", "conversion_multiplier": 0.2, "cap": 0.04}, "minerals": {"growth_kind": "market_demand_growth", "conversion_multiplier": 0.22, "cap": 0.04}, "supply": {"growth_kind": "trade_restriction_growth", "conversion_multiplier": 0.25, "cap": 0.04}, "bioengineered": {"growth_kind": "publication_capability_proxy", "conversion_multiplier": 0.28, "cap": 0.04}, "autonomousw": {"growth_kind": "market_capability_growth", "conversion_multiplier": 0.25, "cap": 0.04}, "geopolitics": {"growth_kind": "spending_conflict_pressure", "conversion_multiplier": 0.55, "cap": 0.045}, "displacement": {"growth_kind": "exposed_population_growth", "conversion_multiplier": 0.75, "cap": 0.04}, "pandemics": {"growth_kind": "event_frequency_growth", "conversion_multiplier": 0.9, "cap": 0.05}, "pollution": {"growth_kind": "production_pressure_growth", "conversion_multiplier": 0.7, "cap": 0.04}, "authoritarian": {"growth_kind": "population_share_proxy", "conversion_multiplier": 0.8, "cap": 0.04}, "biodiversity": {"growth_kind": "assessment_and_extinction_pressure_proxy", "conversion_multiplier": 0.7, "cap": 0.035}, "water": {"growth_kind": "scarcity_exposure_growth", "conversion_multiplier": 0.9, "cap": 0.035}, "amr": {"growth_kind": "selection_pressure_growth", "conversion_multiplier": 0.85, "cap": 0.035}, "debt": {"growth_kind": "macro_balance_proxy", "conversion_multiplier": 0.6, "cap": 0.03}, "climate": {"growth_kind": "direct_risk_pressure_proxy", "conversion_multiplier": 1.0, "cap": 0.035}, "nuclear": {"growth_kind": "stockpile_modernization_risk_proxy", "conversion_multiplier": 0.9, "cap": 0.035}, "economic": {"growth_kind": "expert_systemic_fragility_proxy", "conversion_multiplier": 1.0, "cap": 0.03}, "oceans": {"growth_kind": "composite_degradation_pressure", "conversion_multiplier": 1.0, "cap": 0.03}, "soils": {"growth_kind": "land_degradation_pressure", "conversion_multiplier": 1.0, "cap": 0.025} } }, "climate.scale": { "mu": 4.7, "lo": 3.7, "hi": 5.0, "source": "IPCC, 2023: Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report. IPCC", "url": "https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "IPCC AR6 Synthesis Report concludes that climate change is causing widespread, substantial and, in some cases, irreversible damage to natural and human systems globally, with risks escalating rapidly beyond 1.5–2°C, justifying a near-civilizational scale score with some uncertainty over how far impacts cascade into full systemic collapse." }, "climate.urgency": { "mu": 4.5, "lo": 3.5, "hi": 5.0, "source": "IPCC, 2023: Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report. IPCC", "url": "https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "The IPCC AR6 Synthesis Report states that there is a rapidly closing window to secure a liveable and sustainable future and that near-term actions this decade critically determine long-term outcomes, while WMO finds 2024 already around 1.55°C above pre-industrial levels, supporting very high but not maximal urgency with some debate over the remaining response time." }, "climate.acceleration": { "mu": 4.2, "lo": 3.2, "hi": 5.0, "source": "WMO, 2025: State of the Global Climate 2024. World Meteorological Organization", "url": "https://wmo.int/publication-series/state-of-global-climate/state-of-global-climate-2024", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "The WMO State of the Global Climate 2024 reports record greenhouse gas concentrations, the warmest year on record, eight consecutive record years for ocean heat content, the largest three‑year glacier loss on record, and a doubling of the rate of sea-level rise since satellite measurements began, indicating strongly accelerating physical indicators even though some regional trends are more linear." }, "climate.interdependence": { "mu": 4.6, "lo": 3.6, "hi": 5.0, "source": "Richardson et al., 2023: Earth beyond six of nine planetary boundaries. Science Advances", "url": "https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.adh2458", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "Richardson et al. identify climate change as one of two core planetary boundaries whose transgression amplifies risks in other boundaries such as biosphere integrity, land use and biogeochemical flows, and IPCC AR6 emphasises tight coupling between climate, ecosystems and human systems, supporting a very high interdependence score with modest uncertainty about exact network strength." }, "climate.irreversibility": { "mu": 4.6, "lo": 3.6, "hi": 5.0, "source": "WMO, 2025: State of the Global Climate 2024. World Meteorological Organization", "url": "https://wmo.int/publication-series/state-of-global-climate/state-of-global-climate-2024", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "The WMO report notes that ocean warming and sea-level rise are effectively irreversible over hundreds to thousands of years and that recent glacier mass losses are unprecedented, while the Global Tipping Points Report highlights potential irreversible ice-sheet, permafrost and coral reef tipping points between 1.5–2.5°C, justifying a very high irreversibility score with some residual uncertainty over the exact fraction of impacts that can still be reversed." }, "climate.gov_failure": { "mu": 3.8, "lo": 3.0, "hi": 4.8, "source": "IEA, 2024: World Energy Outlook 2024. International Energy Agency", "url": "https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/140a0470-5b90-4922-a0e9-838b3ac6918c/WorldEnergyOutlook2024.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "IEA WEO 2024 estimates that under current policies (STEPS) the world is still on track for around 2.4°C warming by 2100, with only partial improvement under pledged-policy scenarios, and IPCC AR6 stresses that current mitigation and adaptation are insufficient to limit warming to 1.5°C, indicating serious but not total governance failure given existing frameworks like the Paris Agreement and some progress in renewables deployment." }, "climate.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.0178, "lo": 0.01, "hi": 0.0276, "source": "IEA, 2024: World Energy Outlook 2024. International Energy Agency", "url": "https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/140a0470-5b90-4922-a0e9-838b3ac6918c/WorldEnergyOutlook2024.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-25", "strength": "anchored_judgment", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (0.018/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 1, 0.035) under growth kind 'direct_risk_pressure_proxy'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: IEA WEO 2024 and associated analysis suggest a roughly 2.4°C warming outcome under current policies versus around 1.5°C in a net‑zero scenario, implying a substantial additional cumulative risk this century, while the Global Tipping Points Report indicates that risks rise steeply between 1.5–2.5°C; mapping these scenario spreads to an annualised risk-pressure increase under business-as-usual supports a central estimate around 1.8% per year with a plausible range of roughly 1–2.8% given uncertainties in non-linear impacts and policy slippage. [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=expert_mapping; raw_indicator_growth=0.018; risk_conversion=0.997762; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "expert_mapping", "risk_conversion": 0.997762, "raw_indicator_growth": 0.018, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 0.018/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 0.997762, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "climate.threshold": { "mu": 8.8, "lo": 8.3, "hi": 9.3, "source": "Richardson et al., 2023: Earth beyond six of nine planetary boundaries. Science Advances", "url": "https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.adh2458", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "anchored_judgment", "note": "No primary quantitative source exists for this abstract destabilization threshold; the range is calibrated relative to the planetary boundaries framing in which climate change is a core, already transgressed boundary, and to the dashboard convention that climate’s destabilization level is set higher than most environmental threats but slightly below nuclear conflict, reflecting the combination of high systemic vulnerability and still-partial governability." }, "biodiversity.scale": { "mu": 4.6, "lo": 3.6, "hi": 5.0, "source": "IPBES, 2019: Global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services – Summary for Policymakers", "url": "https://www.ipbes.net/system/files/2021-06/2020%20IPBES%20GLOBAL%20REPORT(FIRST%20PART)_V3_SINGLE.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "The IPBES Global Assessment concludes that around one million species are threatened with extinction and that nature’s contributions to people are being severely degraded, with risks of large-scale ecosystem and food, water and health impacts, supporting a near‑civilizational scale score while allowing some uncertainty over how far loss of ecosystem services cascades into full societal collapse." }, "biodiversity.urgency": { "mu": 4.3, "lo": 3.3, "hi": 5.0, "source": "IPBES, 2024: Transformative Change Assessment – Summary for Policymakers", "url": "https://www.ipbes.net/document-library-catalogue/summary-policymakers-transformative-change-assessment-ipbes1112add2", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "The IPBES Transformative Change Assessment stresses that biodiversity is deteriorating at rates unprecedented in human history and that only rapid, system-wide transformative change this decade can meet the 2050 Vision for Biodiversity, indicating that the crisis is already unfolding with high urgency even though some drivers act over multi-decadal timescales." }, "biodiversity.acceleration": { "mu": 4.3, "lo": 3.3, "hi": 5.0, "source": "IPBES, 2019: Global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services – Summary for Policymakers", "url": "https://www.ipbes.net/system/files/2021-06/2020%20IPBES%20GLOBAL%20REPORT(FIRST%20PART)_V3_SINGLE.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "IPBES reports that extinction rates are tens to hundreds of times higher than background and are accelerating due to intensifying direct and indirect drivers, while IUCN-linked time series show large increases in the number of threatened species since 2000, supporting a high acceleration score with some uncertainty arising from incomplete taxonomic and geographic coverage." }, "biodiversity.interdependence": { "mu": 4.5, "lo": 3.5, "hi": 5.0, "source": "IPBES, 2019: Global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services – Summary for Policymakers", "url": "https://www.ipbes.net/system/files/2021-06/2020%20IPBES%20GLOBAL%20REPORT(FIRST%20PART)_V3_SINGLE.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "IPBES highlights strong interlinkages between biodiversity, climate, water, food and health systems, and Richardson et al. identify biosphere integrity as a core planetary boundary whose transgression interacts nonlinearly with climate and land-system change, indicating a deeply networked threat with some uncertainty over exact coupling strengths to socio-technical risks." }, "biodiversity.irreversibility": { "mu": 4.7, "lo": 3.7, "hi": 5.0, "source": "IPBES, 2019: Global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services – Summary for Policymakers", "url": "https://www.ipbes.net/system/files/2021-06/2020%20IPBES%20GLOBAL%20REPORT(FIRST%20PART)_V3_SINGLE.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "IPBES and the planetary boundaries literature emphasise that species extinctions and many ecosystem regime shifts are irreversible on human timescales and that genetic diversity loss undermines future resilience, warranting a very high irreversibility score while recognising that some ecosystem functions can recover locally under strong protection and restoration." }, "biodiversity.gov_failure": { "mu": 4.2, "lo": 3.2, "hi": 5.0, "source": "IPBES, 2024: Transformative Change Assessment – Summary for Policymakers", "url": "https://www.ipbes.net/document-library-catalogue/summary-policymakers-transformative-change-assessment-ipbes1112add2", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "The Transformative Change Assessment concludes that existing governance has failed to address underlying drivers of biodiversity loss, that past Aichi Targets were largely missed, and that deep, system-wide reorganization of economies and institutions is required, suggesting severe governance failure despite some progress via CBD, the Kunming–Montreal framework and protected areas." }, "biodiversity.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.0241, "lo": 0.0145, "hi": 0.0342, "source": "SpeciesRadar, 2025: Threatened species over time (IUCN Red List data)", "url": "https://www.speciesradar.org", "accessed": "2026-04-25", "strength": "anchored_judgment", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (0.035/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 0.7, 0.035) under growth kind 'assessment_and_extinction_pressure_proxy'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: SpeciesRadar, based on IUCN Red List data, reports that the number of threatened species (CR+EN+VU) increased from about 11,046 in 2000 to roughly 48,646 in 2025, a more than threefold rise corresponding to an annual growth of several percent, so a central risk-pressure increase of 3.5% per year with a plausible 2.1–5.0% range reflects this trajectory while allowing for data gaps and the fact that red-listing efforts also expand over time. [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=indicator_growth; raw_indicator_growth=0.035; risk_conversion=0.700552; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "indicator_growth", "risk_conversion": 0.700552, "raw_indicator_growth": 0.035, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 0.035/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 0.700552, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "biodiversity.threshold": { "mu": 8.4, "lo": 7.9, "hi": 8.9, "source": "Richardson et al., 2023: Earth beyond six of nine planetary boundaries. Science Advances", "url": "https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.adh2458", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "anchored_judgment", "note": "No primary quantitative source exists for a single destabilization threshold for biodiversity; this range is set slightly below the climate threshold but still high, reflecting that the biosphere integrity boundary is assessed as heavily transgressed and co-core with climate in the planetary boundaries framework while recognising that some regions retain significant adaptive capacity." }, "nuclear.scale": { "mu": 4.8, "lo": 3.8, "hi": 5.0, "source": "Robock et al., 2007: Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals. Journal of Geophysical Research", "url": "https://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockNW2006JD008235.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "Robock et al. show that even a partial use of current nuclear arsenals could produce severe global climatic cooling and agricultural collapse, while Baum’s analysis classifies large nuclear war as a global catastrophic risk with potential to kill billions and set civilisation back centuries, supporting a near‑maximal scale score with some residual uncertainty over whether full human extinction would occur." }, "nuclear.urgency": { "mu": 4.4, "lo": 3.4, "hi": 5.0, "source": "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists / FAS, 2025: 89 Seconds to Midnight Signals Growing Nuclear Risk", "url": "https://fas.org/publication/2025-growing-nuclear-risk/", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "The Bulletin’s Doomsday Clock, as summarised by FAS, was set to 89 seconds to midnight in 2025 and then moved even closer in 2026, explicitly citing worsening nuclear dangers, eroding arms control and active conflicts, indicating that nuclear escalation risk is already acute even though actual use remains a low-frequency event, which justifies very high urgency with uncertainty over how quickly conditions could deteriorate." }, "nuclear.acceleration": { "mu": 3.8, "lo": 3.0, "hi": 4.8, "source": "SIPRI, 2025: SIPRI Yearbook 2025 – World nuclear forces", "url": "https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-06/yb25_summary_en.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "SIPRI reports that at the start of 2025 the nine nuclear-armed states held about 12,241 warheads, that 9,614 were in military stockpiles and around 3,912 deployed, and that nearly all states are modernising and in some cases expanding arsenals, with military stockpiles beginning to increase again after decades of decline, supporting a moderately high acceleration score while acknowledging that total inventories are still below Cold War peaks." }, "nuclear.interdependence": { "mu": 4.0, "lo": 3.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "SIPRI, 2025: SIPRI Yearbook 2025 – International stability, human security and the nuclear challenge", "url": "https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB25c01.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "SIPRI describes how nuclear risks are intertwined with great‑power competition, regional conflicts, cyber operations and emerging technologies, and the Doomsday Clock statements explicitly link nuclear, climate, biological and AI threats, implying strong but not fully systemic interdependence given that many other global risks can evolve without immediate nuclear involvement." }, "nuclear.irreversibility": { "mu": 4.7, "lo": 3.7, "hi": 5.0, "source": "Robock et al., 2007: Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals. Journal of Geophysical Research", "url": "https://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockNW2006JD008235.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "Climate-model studies of nuclear winter show that smoke from a large or even regional nuclear war could cause multi‑year global cooling and agricultural collapse, while Baum’s assessment emphasises that such a war could cause long‑lasting damage to infrastructure, economies and human capital, justifying a very high irreversibility score even though some ecosystems and societies might eventually recover over many decades." }, "nuclear.gov_failure": { "mu": 4.4, "lo": 3.4, "hi": 5.0, "source": "SIPRI, 2025: SIPRI Yearbook 2025 – World nuclear forces; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2025 Doomsday Clock Statement", "url": "https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2025/06", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "SIPRI documents the weakening or collapse of key arms control agreements and ongoing large-scale modernisation programmes in all nuclear-armed states, while the Doomsday Clock statement explicitly attributes the clock’s proximity to midnight to failures of political leadership on nuclear risk, indicating severe governance failure despite the existence of the NPT and some bilateral arrangements." }, "nuclear.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.0161, "lo": 0.0098, "hi": 0.0257, "source": "SIPRI, 2025: SIPRI Yearbook 2025 – World nuclear forces; FAS, 2026: Status of World Nuclear Forces", "url": "https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/", "accessed": "2026-04-25", "strength": "anchored_judgment", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (0.018/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 0.9, 0.035) under growth kind 'stockpile_modernization_risk_proxy'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: Recent SIPRI and FAS assessments indicate that while total nuclear inventories are roughly stable around 12,000 warheads, usable military stockpiles are beginning to increase again and modernisation is accelerating, suggesting a modest but positive annual increase in underlying risk pressure; treating these trends as a single quantitative anchor and applying a conservative 0.6–1.6 uncertainty factor yields a central estimate of about 1.8% per year with a plausible range of roughly 1.1–2.9% given uncertainties in crisis dynamics and technology interactions. [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=expert_mapping; raw_indicator_growth=0.018; risk_conversion=0.902471; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "expert_mapping", "risk_conversion": 0.902471, "raw_indicator_growth": 0.018, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 0.018/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 0.902471, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "nuclear.threshold": { "mu": 9.2, "lo": 8.7, "hi": 9.7, "source": "Baum, 2019: Nuclear War as a Global Catastrophic Risk. Journal of Benefit‑Cost Analysis", "url": "https://www.jhuapl.edu/sites/default/files/2022-12/NuclearWarGlobalRisk.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "anchored_judgment", "note": "No primary quantitative source specifies an abstract destabilization threshold for nuclear conflict; this range is calibrated to place nuclear slightly above climate on the dashboard (≈9.2 versus 8.8), reflecting Baum’s conclusion that large nuclear war is a paradigmatic global catastrophic risk with robust but imperfect deterrence and command-and-control barriers that make destabilization hard but not impossible." }, "water.scale": { "mu": 4.5, "lo": 4.1, "hi": 4.9, "source": "The United Nations World Water Development Report 2024: Water for Prosperity and Peace, UNESCO World Water Assessment Programme, 2024", "url": "https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000388948", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "WWDR 2024 reports that roughly half of the world’s population already experiences severe water scarcity for at least part of the year, with 2.2 billion lacking safely managed drinking water and 3.5 billion lacking safely managed sanitation, indicating a near-civilizational scale threat." }, "water.urgency": { "mu": 4.5, "lo": 4.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "The United Nations World Water Development Report 2024: Water for Prosperity and Peace, UNESCO World Water Assessment Programme, 2024", "url": "https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000388948", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "WWDR 2024 and its executive summary state that as of 2022 roughly half of the world’s population already experiences severe water scarcity at least part of the year and one quarter faces extremely high water stress, implying the crisis is ongoing rather than future." }, "water.acceleration": { "mu": 4.0, "lo": 3.0, "hi": 4.7, "source": "State of Global Water Resources 2024, World Meteorological Organization, 2025", "url": "https://www.unwater.org/publications/wmo-state-of-global-water-resources-2024", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "The WMO State of Global Water Resources report describes an increasingly erratic hydrological cycle, with only about one‑third of river basins in normal conditions in 2024 and repeated years of extreme droughts and floods, while WWDR 2024 projects further intensification under climate change, supporting a high but not maximal acceleration score." }, "water.interdependence": { "mu": 4.5, "lo": 4.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "The Economics of Water: Valuing the Hydrological Cycle as a Global Common Good, Global Commission on the Economics of Water, 2024", "url": "https://www.unwater.org/publications/the-economics-of-water-valuing-the-hydrological-cycle-as-a-global-common-good", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "The Global Commission on the Economics of Water frames the hydrological cycle as a global common good tightly coupled to climate change, biodiversity loss, food systems, migration and economic stability, emphasizing deep systemic interdependence rather than an isolated sectoral issue." }, "water.irreversibility": { "mu": 4.2, "lo": 3.7, "hi": 4.8, "source": "State of Global Water Resources 2024, World Meteorological Organization, 2025", "url": "https://www.unwater.org/publications/wmo-state-of-global-water-resources-2024", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "WMO finds that all monitored glacier regions have been losing mass for multiple consecutive years and documents persistent terrestrial water storage deficits in key basins, while WWDR 2024 notes chronic aquifer over‑extraction, together indicating that a substantial portion of the damage unfolds on decadal to centennial timescales and is only partially reversible." }, "water.gov_failure": { "mu": 4.2, "lo": 3.5, "hi": 4.8, "source": "The United Nations World Water Development Report 2024: Water for Prosperity and Peace, UNESCO World Water Assessment Programme, 2024", "url": "https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000388948", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Despite decades of international commitments, WWDR 2024 concludes that SDG 6 is badly off‑track, with billions still lacking safely managed water and sanitation and rising water‑related conflict risks, indicating major governance gaps even though some national and transboundary regimes function relatively well." }, "water.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.0245, "lo": 0.0134, "hi": 0.031, "source": "The world’s road to water scarcity: shortage and stress in the 20th century and pathways towards sustainability, Kummu et al., Scientific Reports, 2016", "url": "https://www.nature.com/articles/srep38495", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (0.0276/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 0.9, 0.035) under growth kind 'scarcity_exposure_growth'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: Kummu et al. estimate that the population living under water scarcity grew from about 0.24 billion (14% of global population) in the 1900s to 3.8 billion (58%) in the 2000s, implying an average continuous growth rate of about 2.8% per year in scarcity‑exposed population, while complementary studies on water shortage show somewhat lower increases, motivating a 1.5–3.5% per year 90% interval. [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=indicator_growth; raw_indicator_growth=0.0276; risk_conversion=0.899876; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "indicator_growth", "risk_conversion": 0.899876, "raw_indicator_growth": 0.0276, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 0.0276/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 0.899876, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "water.threshold": { "mu": 8.6, "lo": 8.1, "hi": 9.0, "source": "Expert judgment anchored to WWDR 2024 and WMO State of Global Water Resources 2024", "url": "", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "expert_judgment", "note": "No primary source defines a normalized destabilization threshold for freshwater stress; this range places water slightly below climate change (≈8.8) but close to nuclear risk (≈9.2), reflecting WWDR 2024 and WMO evidence that half the global population already faces severe scarcity and that hydrological extremes are rapidly intensifying." }, "soils.scale": { "mu": 4.3, "lo": 3.8, "hi": 4.8, "source": "Global Land Outlook Second Edition: Land Restoration for Recovery and Resilience, UNCCD, 2022", "url": "https://www.unccd.int/sites/default/files/2022-04/UNCCD_GLO2_low-res_2.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "UNCCD’s GLO2 and associated summaries estimate that up to 40% of the planet’s land is already degraded, directly affecting roughly half of humanity and putting about half of global GDP at risk, and IPBES finds the well‑being of at least 3.2 billion people undermined by land degradation, indicating very large but not yet fully civilizational impacts." }, "soils.urgency": { "mu": 4.0, "lo": 3.5, "hi": 4.6, "source": "The IPBES Assessment Report on Land Degradation and Restoration, IPBES, 2018", "url": "https://library.unccd.int/Details/books/1072", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "IPBES concludes that current land degradation is already negatively affecting the well‑being of at least 3.2 billion people and costing more than 10% of annual global gross product, while GLO2 warns that business‑as‑usual will significantly worsen degradation by 2050, supporting a high urgency score but slightly lower than for water scarcity which is manifesting more acutely in the near term." }, "soils.acceleration": { "mu": 3.8, "lo": 3.0, "hi": 4.6, "source": "Global Land Outlook Second Edition: Land Restoration for Recovery and Resilience, UNCCD, 2022", "url": "https://www.unccd.int/sites/default/files/2022-04/UNCCD_GLO2_low-res_2.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "GLO2 and related technical briefs state that 20–40% of global land area is already degraded and that, under business‑as‑usual, an additional land area roughly the size of South America (about 16–18 million km²) will become degraded or show continued degradation by 2050, indicating an accelerating but still partially manageable deterioration." }, "soils.interdependence": { "mu": 4.5, "lo": 4.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "The State of the World’s Land and Water Resources for Food and Agriculture, FAO, 2021 update", "url": "https://www.fao.org/3/cb7654en/online/cb7654en.html", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "FAO’s SOLAW and GLO2 emphasize that land and soil degradation directly undermines food security, water regulation, biodiversity, climate mitigation via soil carbon, and rural livelihoods, showing that soil systems sit at the nexus of food, water, climate and biodiversity and are therefore deeply interdependent with multiple other global risks." }, "soils.irreversibility": { "mu": 4.2, "lo": 3.7, "hi": 4.8, "source": "IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and Land (SRCCL) and AR6 WG2 Cross‑Chapter Paper on Deserts and Desertification, IPCC, 2019–2022", "url": "https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/4/2022/11/SRCCL_Chapter_3.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "IPCC assessments find that desertification and soil organic matter loss in drylands already affect hundreds of millions of people and that degradation of soils and vegetation productivity can persist for decades or longer, even under improved management, implying high but not absolutely permanent irreversibility for many degraded landscapes." }, "soils.gov_failure": { "mu": 3.9, "lo": 3.2, "hi": 4.7, "source": "Global Land Outlook Second Edition: Land Restoration for Recovery and Resilience, UNCCD, 2022", "url": "https://www.unccd.int/sites/default/files/2022-04/UNCCD_GLO2_low-res_2.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "GLO2 characterizes chronic land degradation as the result of mismanagement of land, soil and water resources and notes that, despite UNCCD and many national initiatives, restoration commitments cover only about one‑fifth of identified potential, indicating substantial but not total governance failure." }, "soils.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.009, "lo": 0.007, "hi": 0.0119, "source": "Land, Climate and Development: Technical Brief, UNCCD, 2022", "url": "https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/land_climate_and_development_by_unccd.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-25", "strength": "moderate", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (0.009/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 1, 0.025) under growth kind 'land_degradation_pressure'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: UNCCD technical material and GLO2 indicate that 20–40% of global land is currently degraded and that under business‑as‑usual an additional land area roughly the size of South America (about 16 million km²) will be degraded by 2050. The 0.7–1.2%/yr rate is the annual fractional growth in the already-degraded land area (16 mln km² added to a current 30–60 mln km² degraded base over 35 years), not the rate of new degradation as a share of total land area (which would be roughly 0.3%/yr). Central estimate near 0.9% reflects this compounding-pressure framing. [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=expert_mapping; raw_indicator_growth=0.009; risk_conversion=1; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "expert_mapping", "risk_conversion": 1.0, "raw_indicator_growth": 0.009, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 0.009/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 1, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "soils.threshold": { "mu": 8.3, "lo": 7.8, "hi": 8.8, "source": "Expert judgment anchored to UNCCD GLO2 and IPBES Land Degradation Assessment", "url": "", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "expert_judgment", "note": "No standardized destabilization threshold exists for soil and food‑system degradation; this range places soils slightly below water but close to climate change by weighting GLO2 findings that up to 40% of land is degraded and IPBES conclusions that degradation undermines the well‑being of at least 3.2 billion people and could drive large yield losses and migration by 2050." }, "oceans.scale": { "mu": 4.6, "lo": 4.1, "hi": 5.0, "source": "IPCC SROCC, 2019; IPBES Global Assessment, 2019; FAO Review of the State of World Marine Fishery Resources, 2025", "url": "https://www.ipcc.ch/srocc/chapter/summary-for-policymakers/", "accessed": "2026-04-25", "strength": "strong", "note": "Ocean degradation is treated as a multi-driver biospheric threat, not only as acidification. IPCC SROCC documents ocean warming, acidification, deoxygenation, sea-level rise and marine heatwaves; IPBES identifies direct exploitation of fish and seafood as the largest relative driver of change in marine ecosystems; FAO’s 2025 assessment reports that 35.5% of assessed marine fishery stocks are overfished. This justifies a very high scale score because fisheries, marine food webs, coral systems, carbon cycling and coastal societies are jointly exposed." }, "oceans.urgency": { "mu": 4.4, "lo": 3.9, "hi": 5.0, "source": "UNESCO IOC 2024 State of the Ocean Report; FAO Review of the State of World Marine Fishery Resources, 2025", "url": "https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/fao-releases-the-most-detailed-global-assessment-of-marine-fish-stocks-to-date/en", "accessed": "2026-04-25", "strength": "strong", "note": "Urgency is raised because degradation is already active across physical, chemical and biological channels. UNESCO reports worsening warming, acidification, deoxygenation, pollution, biodiversity loss, marine heatwaves and coral bleaching, while FAO reports that 35.5% of assessed marine fishery stocks are overfished. These are not distant hypothetical pressures but present drivers of fisheries decline, ecosystem instability and food-security risk." }, "oceans.acceleration": { "mu": 4.3, "lo": 3.6, "hi": 4.9, "source": "IPCC SROCC, 2019; UNESCO IOC 2024 State of the Ocean Report; FAO Review of the State of World Marine Fishery Resources, 2025", "url": "https://oceandecade.org/publications/2024-state-of-the-ocean-report/", "accessed": "2026-04-25", "strength": "strong", "note": "Acceleration is raised because ocean degradation is worsening through interacting trends rather than a single slowly moving pH indicator. Assessments describe accelerating ocean heat content, sea-level rise, marine heatwaves, acidification and deoxygenation, while fishery data show persistent global overfishing pressure. The score remains below the maximum because effective regional fishery management can still reverse some stock declines, but the combined trajectory is clearly faster than the earlier pH-only proxy implied." }, "oceans.interdependence": { "mu": 4.5, "lo": 4.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "IPBES Global Assessment, 2019; UNESCO IOC 2024 State of the Ocean Report; FAO Review of the State of World Marine Fishery Resources, 2025", "url": "https://www.ipbes.net/system/files/2021-06/2020%20IPBES%20GLOBAL%20REPORT%28FIRST%20PART%29_V3_SINGLE.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-25", "strength": "strong", "note": "Interdependence is raised because overfishing, warming, acidification, deoxygenation and pollution act on the same food webs and ecological functions. Ocean degradation couples directly to climate regulation, carbon sequestration, biodiversity loss, fisheries productivity, food security, coastal livelihoods, tourism economies and disaster exposure. This makes the threat a systemic network risk rather than a narrow environmental variable." }, "oceans.irreversibility": { "mu": 4.7, "lo": 4.2, "hi": 5.0, "source": "Oschlies et al., Nature Communications, 2021; IPCC SROCC, 2019; IPBES Global Assessment, 2019", "url": "https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-021-22584-4", "accessed": "2026-04-25", "strength": "strong", "note": "The score remains very high. Model simulations indicate that even if CO2 emissions ceased immediately, deep-ocean oxygen content would continue to decline, while IPCC notes that many ocean changes are effectively irreversible on centennial to millennial timescales. Overfishing-driven food-web simplification and local stock collapses can sometimes recover under strong management, but recovery may be slow, incomplete or blocked by warming, acidification and habitat degradation." }, "oceans.gov_failure": { "mu": 4.3, "lo": 3.7, "hi": 4.9, "source": "FAO Review of the State of World Marine Fishery Resources, 2025; UNESCO IOC 2024 State of the Ocean Report", "url": "https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/fao-releases-the-most-detailed-global-assessment-of-marine-fish-stocks-to-date/en", "accessed": "2026-04-25", "strength": "strong", "note": "Governance failure is raised because the existence of 35.5% overfished assessed marine stocks shows that current management is insufficient at the global level, despite clear evidence that effective management can improve sustainability in some regions. The High Seas Treaty and regional fishery bodies indicate partial institutional capacity, but enforcement gaps, illegal and unreported fishing, fragmented high-seas governance, pollution and climate-driven stressors leave a large residual governance deficit." }, "oceans.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.0119, "lo": 0.006, "hi": 0.0247, "source": "FAO Review of the State of World Marine Fishery Resources, 2025; JMA global ocean acidification update, 2025; IPCC SROCC, 2019; UNESCO IOC 2024 State of the Ocean Report", "url": "https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/fao-releases-the-most-detailed-global-assessment-of-marine-fish-stocks-to-date/en", "accessed": "2026-04-25", "strength": "anchored_judgment", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (0.012/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 1, 0.03) under growth kind 'composite_degradation_pressure'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: This replaces the earlier pH-only fractional proxy, which incorrectly treated pH as a linear magnitude and therefore understated risk growth. The revised value is a composite annualized ocean-degradation pressure proxy anchored to: logarithmic acidification chemistry, where a pH decline of about 0.018 units per decade implies roughly 4% more hydrogen-ion concentration per decade; FAO evidence that 35.5% of assessed marine fishery stocks are overfished; and accelerating heat, marine-heatwave, deoxygenation and ecosystem-stress indicators. The central 1.2%/yr value is not a direct pH CAGR; it is a model proxy for combined biological, chemical and physical degradation pressure. [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=expert_mapping; raw_indicator_growth=0.012; risk_conversion=0.997605; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "expert_mapping", "risk_conversion": 0.997605, "raw_indicator_growth": 0.012, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 0.012/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 0.997605, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "oceans.threshold": { "mu": 8.4, "lo": 7.9, "hi": 9.0, "source": "Expert judgment anchored to IPCC SROCC, IPBES Global Assessment, FAO marine fish stock assessment, and UNESCO 2024 State of the Ocean Report", "url": "https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/fao-releases-the-most-detailed-global-assessment-of-marine-fish-stocks-to-date/en", "accessed": "2026-04-25", "strength": "anchored_judgment", "note": "The ocean threshold is slightly lowered from 8.5 to 8.4 because overfishing, fisheries decline and food-web simplification make functional marine-ecosystem failure plausible before a single global-ocean collapse threshold is reached. The threshold remains high because global ocean collapse is not a single uniform event; it is better modeled as regional and functional failures of fish stocks, coral systems, oxygen-limited zones, coastal protection and marine food webs that accumulate into systemic destabilization." }, "pollution.scale": { "mu": 4.3, "lo": 3.8, "hi": 4.8, "source": "Landrigan et al., 'Pollution and health: a progress update', Lancet Planetary Health, 2022", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196(22)00090-0", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "Pollution causes 9 million premature deaths annually (1 in 6 deaths worldwide), exceeds HIV/AIDS + TB + malaria combined, and is distributed across 204 countries. Scale of mortality places this well above regional or sectoral harm, calibrating to 4–5 on a civilizational-risk anchor." }, "pollution.urgency": { "mu": 3.8, "lo": 3.2, "hi": 4.4, "source": "Landrigan et al., 'Pollution and health: a progress update', Lancet Planetary Health, 2022", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196(22)00090-0", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "Deaths from toxic chemical pollution rose 66% since 2000, with 1.8 million deaths from chemicals in 2019 and projected doubling of chemical production by 2030. The Commission calls for 'urgent attention', but the 20-year horizon and existing regulatory frameworks moderate immediate urgency below 4.5." }, "pollution.acceleration": { "mu": 3.6, "lo": 2.9, "hi": 4.3, "source": "UNEP, 'Global Chemicals Outlook II: From Legacies to Innovative Solutions', 2019", "url": "https://orbit.dtu.dk/files/170843838/GCOII_synth.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "Chemical industry production capacity doubled between 2000 and 2017 (~4% CAGR), with sales projected to nearly double again by 2030; fastest growth in Asia-Pacific, Africa, and Middle East. This compounding trajectory calibrates to moderate-high acceleration, constrained by uneven regulatory responses across regions." }, "pollution.interdependence": { "mu": 4.0, "lo": 3.4, "hi": 4.6, "source": "Landrigan et al., 'Pollution and health: a progress update', Lancet Planetary Health, 2022", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196(22)00090-0", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "Pollution-attributable mortality is distributed across air (6.67M), water (1.36M), and chemical exposure pathways, with 90% of deaths in low-to-middle income countries, coupling trade flows, industrial supply chains, and health systems. Cross-pathway synergies (e.g. endocrine disruption + air + water) justify high interdependence." }, "pollution.irreversibility": { "mu": 4.2, "lo": 3.6, "hi": 4.8, "source": "Cousins et al., 'The high persistence of PFAS is sufficient for their management as a chemical class', Environmental Science: Processes & Impacts, 2020", "url": "https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7784706/", "accessed": "2026-04-25", "strength": "moderate", "note": "PFAS environmental half-lives measured in decades to centuries in soil, groundwater, and biota, with no known natural degradation pathway under ambient conditions, providing an upper-bound anchor for irreversibility. However, the broader pollution domain is heterogeneous: ambient air pollution and many water pollutants partially recover when emissions stop, while persistent organic pollutants, heavy metals and microplastics remain in the environment for decades to centuries. Score reflects a blend of high-persistence (PFAS, POPs, heavy metals) and partially recoverable (air, conventional water) classes rather than the PFAS extreme alone." }, "pollution.gov_failure": { "mu": 3.9, "lo": 3.2, "hi": 4.5, "source": "Landrigan et al., 'Pollution and health: a progress update', Lancet Planetary Health, 2022", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196(22)00090-0", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "Despite deaths remaining at 9 million for the 2015–2019 period, the Commission concludes that 'the situation hasn't improved' and calls for 'stronger focus on hazardous chemical pollution', citing a lack of adequate policies for industrial chemicals. Unchanged mortality despite scientific consensus indicates systemic governance failure." }, "pollution.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.0275, "lo": 0.0139, "hi": 0.04, "source": "UNEP, 'Global Chemicals Outlook II: From Legacies to Innovative Solutions', 2019; SDG Knowledge Hub chapter highlight", "url": "https://orbit.dtu.dk/files/170843838/GCOII_synth.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (0.04/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 0.7, 0.04) under growth kind 'production_pressure_growth'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: Chemical production capacity doubled 2000–2017, implying a CAGR of ~4.2%/yr (ln(2)/17 ≈ 0.0408). GCO II projects near-doubling again 2017–2030, consistent with ~5% CAGR scenario. Lo set at half of central estimate; hi derived from faster-growth Asia-Pacific scenario (~6.8%). [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=market_growth; raw_indicator_growth=0.04; risk_conversion=0.70116; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "market_growth", "risk_conversion": 0.70116, "raw_indicator_growth": 0.04, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 0.04/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 0.70116, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "pollution.threshold": { "mu": 7.8, "lo": 7.3, "hi": 8.3, "source": "Expert judgment anchored to Landrigan et al. 2022 and task-defined anchors", "url": "", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "expert_judgment", "note": "Anchored below climate (8.8) because pollution, while causing comparable current deaths, lacks a single tipping-point mechanism; PFAS persistence approaches irreversible planetary boundary breach (Persson et al. 2022 places humanity beyond safe chemical space), justifying 7.8 as threshold requiring emergency global response." }, "pandemics.scale": { "mu": 4.7, "lo": 4.3, "hi": 5.0, "source": "The Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response, 'COVID-19: Make it the Last Pandemic', 2021", "url": "https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(21)01095-3/fulltext", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "Panel documents COVID-19 as causing over 3.5 million confirmed deaths by May 2021, with economic losses exceeding $10 trillion in 2020–21; it frames pandemic risk as threatening 'global health, economic stability, and social systems' simultaneously. Multi-system civilizational impact calibrates scale to 4.5–5.0." }, "pandemics.urgency": { "mu": 4.5, "lo": 4.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "Global Preparedness Monitoring Board, 'A Fragile State of Preparedness: 2023 Annual Report', GPMB, 2023", "url": "https://www.gpmb.org/reports/annual-report-2023", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "GPMB 2023 concludes global preparedness 'remains inadequate and fragile' with 'some areas declining' since COVID-19, despite post-pandemic reform efforts. Simultaneous declining capacities in core preparedness sectors and rising zoonotic spillover rates justify high urgency, near maximum on the scale." }, "pandemics.acceleration": { "mu": 4.2, "lo": 3.6, "hi": 4.8, "source": "Plowright et al., 'Land use-induced spillover: a call to action to safeguard environmental, animal, and human health', Lancet Planetary Health, 2021", "url": "https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7935684/", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "Authors demonstrate that land-use change, deforestation, wildlife trade, and climate change are accelerating habitat-human interface expansion, systematically increasing spillover probability. Combined with a documented 4.98%/yr rise in spillover frequency (BMJ Global Health 2023), the threat is accelerating on multiple structural drivers." }, "pandemics.interdependence": { "mu": 4.8, "lo": 4.3, "hi": 5.0, "source": "The Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response, 'COVID-19: Make it the Last Pandemic', 2021", "url": "https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(21)01095-3/fulltext", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "COVID-19 demonstrated cascading failures across health systems, global supply chains, financial markets, education, and governance simultaneously. Panel explicitly identifies 'interlocking failures at every stage' of the global system; this multi-domain collapse cascade calibrates interdependence to near-maximum." }, "pandemics.irreversibility": { "mu": 3.2, "lo": 2.5, "hi": 3.9, "source": "Global Preparedness Monitoring Board, 'A Fragile State of Preparedness: 2023 Annual Report', GPMB, 2023", "url": "https://www.gpmb.org/reports/annual-report-2023", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Unlike PFAS or nuclear contamination, pandemic damage (mortality, economic disruption) is in principle recoverable over years to decades; GPMB finds some post-COVID reform progress occurred, indicating reversibility of institutional failure. However, deaths and long COVID sequelae are irreversible, placing mu in the moderate range." }, "pandemics.gov_failure": { "mu": 4.4, "lo": 3.8, "hi": 5.0, "source": "The Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response, 'COVID-19: Make it the Last Pandemic', 2021", "url": "https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(21)01095-3/fulltext", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "Panel documents 'interlocking failures at every stage'—from early warning suppression to inequitable vaccine distribution—and concludes that reform of the WHO, financing, and global alert systems is 'urgent and necessary'. GPMB 2023 finds progress 'remains fragile', with some areas declining, confirming persistent governance failure." }, "pandemics.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.0437, "lo": 0.0285, "hi": 0.05, "source": "Marani et al., 'Historical trends demonstrate a pattern of increasingly frequent and severe spillover events of high-consequence zoonotic viruses', BMJ Global Health, 2023", "url": "https://gh.bmj.com/content/8/11/e012026", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (0.0498/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 0.9, 0.05) under growth kind 'event_frequency_growth'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: Authors fit a negative binomial model to multi-decade high-consequence zoonotic spillover events, finding a 4.98%/yr increase (95% CI 3.22–6.76%) in outbreak frequency, excluding SARS-CoV-2. Lo and hi are taken directly from the reported 95% confidence interval, providing a primary empirical growth rate for this indicator. [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=event_frequency_growth; raw_indicator_growth=0.0498; risk_conversion=0.899183; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "event_frequency_growth", "risk_conversion": 0.899183, "raw_indicator_growth": 0.0498, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 0.0498/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 0.899183, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "pandemics.threshold": { "mu": 8.5, "lo": 8.0, "hi": 9.0, "source": "Expert judgment anchored to task-defined anchors and Independent Panel 2021", "url": "", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "expert_judgment", "note": "Anchored between climate (8.8) and nuclear (9.2): a civilisation-scale engineered or highly transmissible natural pathogen with >30% IFR would represent a near-extinction event comparable to nuclear; a severe but contained pandemic sits below climate. Central estimate 8.5 reflects current natural-pathogen risk, with hi 9.0 for engineered biosecurity scenarios." }, "amr.scale": { "mu": 4.4, "lo": 3.9, "hi": 4.8, "source": "Murray et al., 'Global burden of bacterial antimicrobial resistance in 2019: a systematic analysis', GRAM / Lancet, 2022", "url": "https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(21)02724-0/fulltext", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "GRAM 2022 estimates 1.27 million deaths directly attributable to AMR in 2019 and 4.95 million associated deaths, exceeding HIV/AIDS and malaria. AMR affects surgical safety, cancer chemotherapy, neonatal care, and food security globally, calibrating scale to high on a civilizational-scope anchor." }, "amr.urgency": { "mu": 4.3, "lo": 3.7, "hi": 4.9, "source": "WHO, 'Bacterial Priority Pathogens List 2024', WHO, 2024", "url": "https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240093461", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "WHO 2024 BPPL covers 24 pathogens across 15 families with critical-priority gram-negatives resistant to last-resort carbapenems. Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae are classified as critical and have limited or no treatment options, indicating near-term clinical emergency; the list expansion from 2017 to 2024 signals accelerating pipeline threat." }, "amr.acceleration": { "mu": 3.8, "lo": 3.2, "hi": 4.5, "source": "Laxminarayan et al., 'Global trends in antibiotic consumption during 2016–2023 and future projections', One Health Trust / Lancet Infectious Diseases, 2024", "url": "https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39556760/", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "Global antibiotic consumption increased 16.3% between 2016 and 2023 (~2.2%/yr), driven primarily by low- and middle-income countries, with future projections indicating continued growth. Rising consumption in contexts with weak stewardship accelerates resistance selection pressure, calibrating acceleration to moderately high." }, "amr.interdependence": { "mu": 4.2, "lo": 3.6, "hi": 4.8, "source": "Murray et al., 'Global burden of bacterial antimicrobial resistance in 2019', GRAM / Lancet, 2022", "url": "https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(21)02724-0/fulltext", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "GRAM shows AMR burden entangles surgery, oncology, neonatal care, TB management, and foodborne illness across 204 countries, with sub-Saharan Africa bearing the highest per-capita rate. Agricultural antibiotic use, human medicine, and trade create a global resistance gene pool, indicating high cross-sectoral interdependence." }, "amr.irreversibility": { "mu": 4.0, "lo": 3.4, "hi": 4.6, "source": "O'Neill Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, 'Tackling Drug-Resistant Infections Globally: Final Report and Recommendations', 2016", "url": "https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo_who_wto_ip_ge_16/wipo_who_wto_ip_ge_16_www_356156.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "O'Neill projects 10 million annual deaths by 2050 without action and $100 trillion in lost GDP, implying that failure to act now locks in resistance gene spread that cannot be reversed. Resistance genes persist in microbial populations and agricultural environments across generations, though new antibiotics could partially restore clinical options." }, "amr.gov_failure": { "mu": 4.1, "lo": 3.5, "hi": 4.7, "source": "Laxminarayan et al., 'Global trends in antibiotic consumption during 2016–2023', One Health Trust / Lancet Infectious Diseases, 2024", "url": "https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39556760/", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "Global consumption rose 16.3% in 2016–2023 despite over a decade of WHO stewardship frameworks and NAP mandates, indicating that governance instruments are not translating into consumption reduction. Growth is concentrated in LMICs where regulatory enforcement and diagnostics capacity are weakest, confirming a structural governance gap." }, "amr.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.0185, "lo": 0.0093, "hi": 0.0309, "source": "Laxminarayan et al., 'Global trends in antibiotic consumption during 2016–2023', One Health Trust / Lancet Infectious Diseases, 2024", "url": "https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39556760/", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (0.022/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 0.85, 0.035) under growth kind 'selection_pressure_growth'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: Global antibiotic consumption grew 16.3% over 7 years (2016–2023), implying a CAGR of ~2.19%/yr (ln(1.163)/7). Lo set at half the central estimate (conservative stewardship-effect scenario); hi of 3.7%/yr reflects LMIC-only trajectory where growth is fastest and governance weakest. [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=direct_risk_proxy; raw_indicator_growth=0.022; risk_conversion=0.850126; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "direct_risk_proxy", "risk_conversion": 0.850126, "raw_indicator_growth": 0.022, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 0.022/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 0.850126, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "amr.threshold": { "mu": 8.0, "lo": 7.5, "hi": 8.5, "source": "Expert judgment anchored to O'Neill 2016 projections and GRAM 2022 data", "url": "", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "expert_judgment", "note": "Anchored below pandemics (8.5) because AMR's worst-case trajectory (10M deaths/yr by 2050) is slower-onset than an acute pandemic and partially reversible with new drugs; set above mid-scale at 8.0 because post-antibiotic surgery/cancer risks represent civilizational regression. Range ±0.5 reflects genuine expert disagreement on timing of a 'post-antibiotic era' threshold." }, "bioengineered.scale": { "mu": 4.2, "lo": 3.4, "hi": 4.8, "source": "Mitigating Risks from Gene Editing and Synthetic Biology: Global Governance Priorities, Patrick & Barton, 2024", "url": "https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/mitigating-risks-from-gene-editing-and-synthetic-biology-global-governance-priorities", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Patrick and Barton describe rapid, globally distributed advances in bioscience and bioengineering with inherently dual-use potential that could create unprecedented dangers if misused, implying a high but not maximal systemic scale of engineered biological risks." }, "bioengineered.urgency": { "mu": 4.0, "lo": 3.2, "hi": 4.8, "source": "Mitigating Risks from Gene Editing and Synthetic Biology: Global Governance Priorities, Patrick & Barton, 2024", "url": "https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/mitigating-risks-from-gene-editing-and-synthetic-biology-global-governance-priorities", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "The paper argues that policymakers must address bioscience governance gaps now to avoid being caught flat-footed by the accelerating spread of powerful tools, supporting high urgency but still below the most time-critical risks." }, "bioengineered.acceleration": { "mu": 4.3, "lo": 3.5, "hi": 5.0, "source": "Mitigating Risks from Gene Editing and Synthetic Biology: Global Governance Priorities, Patrick & Barton, 2024", "url": "https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/mitigating-risks-from-gene-editing-and-synthetic-biology-global-governance-priorities", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Patrick and Barton emphasize that rapid advances in bioscience and bioengineering, amplified by machine learning and wider distribution of tools, are quickly expanding dual-use capabilities, justifying very high acceleration scores." }, "bioengineered.interdependence": { "mu": 4.1, "lo": 3.3, "hi": 4.9, "source": "Improving governance in the age of synthetic biology, artificial intelligence and other technologies, Elgabry et al., 2026", "url": "https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/bioengineering-and-biotechnology/articles/10.3389/fbioe.2026.1705143/full", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Frontiers analysis highlights convergence of synthetic biology with AI, cyber and automation, and notes that cyberbiosecurity threats to genetic databases and automated labs can create real-world public health impacts, indicating strong interdependence with other systemic risks." }, "bioengineered.irreversibility": { "mu": 4.4, "lo": 3.6, "hi": 5.0, "source": "Redefining Biological Weapons: Expanding the BWC to Incorporate Emerging Technologies, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2025", "url": "https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/NextGen-Redefining-Biological-Weapons-Final.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "NTI underscores that high-risk dual-use research and novel SynBio-enabled weapons could lead to large-scale biological events where spread and evolution of agents are hard to reverse, warranting very high irreversibility short of absolute." }, "bioengineered.gov_failure": { "mu": 4.0, "lo": 3.2, "hi": 4.8, "source": "Mitigating Risks from Gene Editing and Synthetic Biology: Global Governance Priorities, Patrick & Barton, 2024", "url": "https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/mitigating-risks-from-gene-editing-and-synthetic-biology-global-governance-priorities", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "The report highlights substantial gaps in global governance of gene editing and synthetic biology, including fragmented oversight and inadequate international regimes under the BWC, implying a high probability that governance failures could amplify risk." }, "bioengineered.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.0292, "lo": 0.0163, "hi": 0.04, "source": "Literature review of the trends and issues in synthetic biology (2012–2023), CBD Secretariat, 2024", "url": "https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/cdd0/47d5/a1c4e03006539ca375b70db4/sbstta-26-inf-05-en.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (0.11/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 0.28, 0.04) under growth kind 'publication_capability_proxy'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: A CBD review finds synthetic biology publications grew from about 2,500 in 2012 to 7,900 in 2023 with an average annual growth rate of 11%, so the mu and range reflect this central estimate and plausible variation over the period. [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=capability_growth; raw_indicator_growth=0.11; risk_conversion=0.279801; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "capability_growth", "risk_conversion": 0.279801, "raw_indicator_growth": 0.11, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 0.11/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 0.279801, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "bioengineered.threshold": { "mu": 8.6, "lo": 7.9, "hi": 9.3, "source": "Expert judgment based on NTI, CBD and governance literature", "url": "", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "expert_judgment", "note": "Given evidence of rapidly expanding dual-use capabilities but somewhat more limited current stockpiles compared with nuclear weapons, the systemic catastrophe threshold is placed slightly below nuclear and climate anchors while allowing a wide uncertainty band." }, "ai.scale": { "mu": 4.4, "lo": 3.6, "hi": 5.0, "source": "International AI Safety Report 2025, Bengio et al., 2025", "url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/international-ai-safety-report-2025", "accessed": "2026-04-25", "strength": "moderate", "note": "The International AI Safety Report concludes that unintended behaviors in advanced general-purpose AI could in worst cases lead to catastrophic, potentially irreversible loss of control, implying a very high potential scale of harm." }, "ai.urgency": { "mu": 4.2, "lo": 3.4, "hi": 5.0, "source": "International AI Safety Report 2025, Bengio et al., 2025", "url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/international-ai-safety-report-2025", "accessed": "2026-04-25", "strength": "moderate", "note": "IASR 2025 and the UK AI Safety Institute highlight that capabilities of frontier models and their potential to exacerbate cyber and CBRN threats are advancing rapidly while governance and evaluation remain uneven, supporting high urgency but with some temporal uncertainty." }, "ai.acceleration": { "mu": 4.6, "lo": 3.8, "hi": 5.0, "source": "Frontier AI Trends Report, UK AI Safety Institute, 2025", "url": "https://www.aisi.gov.uk/frontier-ai-trends-report", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "AISI reports that success rates on complex autonomy evaluations for leading models rose from below 5% in early 2023 to above 60% by mid‑2025 and documents sharp acceleration across multiple sensitive domains, justifying an acceleration score near the maximum." }, "ai.interdependence": { "mu": 4.3, "lo": 3.5, "hi": 5.0, "source": "International AI Safety Report 2025, Bengio et al., 2025", "url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/international-ai-safety-report-2025", "accessed": "2026-04-25", "strength": "moderate", "note": "IASR and AISI analyses stress that advanced AI can amplify bio, cyber and information threats by lowering barriers to sophisticated attacks and enabling autonomous operations, indicating very strong interdependence with other global risk systems." }, "ai.irreversibility": { "mu": 4.6, "lo": 3.8, "hi": 5.0, "source": "International AI Safety Report 2025, Bengio et al., 2025", "url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/international-ai-safety-report-2025", "accessed": "2026-04-25", "strength": "moderate", "note": "The report explicitly discusses scenarios of catastrophic, irreversible loss of control over advanced AI systems and notes that such outcomes are taken seriously by many experts, motivating an irreversibility rating close to the maximum." }, "ai.gov_failure": { "mu": 4.3, "lo": 3.5, "hi": 5.0, "source": "International AI Safety Report 2025, Bengio et al., 2025", "url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/international-ai-safety-report-2025", "accessed": "2026-04-25", "strength": "moderate", "note": "IASR 2025 and follow‑on commentary highlight large uncertainties, sparse incident reporting, and lagging governance relative to rapidly scaling capabilities, implying a high likelihood that regulatory and institutional failures could be decisive in AI-related catastrophes." }, "ai.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.0353, "lo": 0.0239, "hi": 0.04, "source": "Training compute of frontier AI models grows by 4–5x per year, Sevilla et al., Epoch AI, 2024", "url": "https://epoch.ai/blog/training-compute-of-frontier-ai-models-grows-by-4-5x-per-year", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (3.1/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 0.025, 0.04) under growth kind 'capability_growth'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: Epoch’s updated database finds training compute for notable and frontier models has grown about 4.1× per year from 2010 to May 2024 (90% CI 3.7–4.6×), corresponding to roughly 310% annual fractional growth with a wide plausible range. [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=capability_growth; raw_indicator_growth=3.1; risk_conversion=0.025018; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "capability_growth", "risk_conversion": 0.025018, "raw_indicator_growth": 3.1, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 3.1/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 0.025018, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "ai.threshold": { "mu": 9.0, "lo": 8.3, "hi": 9.7, "source": "Expert judgment based on IASR and AISI frontier risk framing", "url": "", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "expert_judgment", "note": "Given expert concern about worst‑case AI loss‑of‑control scenarios comparable to or exceeding nuclear and climate catastrophes but with greater uncertainty, the systemic catastrophe threshold is set near the nuclear anchor with a broad uncertainty range." }, "cyber.scale": { "mu": 4.1, "lo": 3.3, "hi": 4.9, "source": "ENISA Threat Landscape 2024, ENISA, 2024", "url": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-2024", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "ENISA’s 2024 Threat Landscape analyzes over 11,000 incidents and highlights ransomware, DDoS and data threats heavily targeting public administration, transport, finance and other critical sectors, indicating a very high but not maximal systemic scale." }, "cyber.urgency": { "mu": 4.0, "lo": 3.2, "hi": 4.8, "source": "ENISA Threat Landscape 2024, ENISA, 2024", "url": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-2024", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "ENISA states that late‑2023 and early‑2024 saw a notable escalation in attack variety, volume and consequences, setting new benchmarks under conditions of geopolitical tension, which supports a high urgency rating." }, "cyber.acceleration": { "mu": 3.8, "lo": 3.0, "hi": 4.6, "source": "ENISA Threat Landscape 2024, ENISA, 2024", "url": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-2024", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "The report documents growth in as‑a‑service ecosystems, increased targeting of critical infrastructure, and AI‑driven phishing and disinformation, suggesting sustained acceleration though some threat types (like ransomware) have stabilized at high volumes." }, "cyber.interdependence": { "mu": 4.2, "lo": 3.4, "hi": 5.0, "source": "ENISA Threat Landscape 2024, ENISA, 2024", "url": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-2024", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "ENISA emphasizes that attacks increasingly exploit supply chains, cloud services and cross‑border infrastructure, with many incidents affecting multiple member states and sectors simultaneously, indicating very strong interdependence with other systems." }, "cyber.irreversibility": { "mu": 3.6, "lo": 2.8, "hi": 4.4, "source": "ENISA Threat Landscape 2024, ENISA, 2024", "url": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-2024", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "While many cyber incidents are technically remediable, ENISA notes that attacks on data, critical infrastructure and public administration can cause long‑lasting economic and societal damage, warranting a moderately high but not extreme irreversibility rating." }, "cyber.gov_failure": { "mu": 3.9, "lo": 3.1, "hi": 4.7, "source": "ENISA, 2024: Threat Landscape 2024; Verizon, 2024: Data Breach Investigations Report.", "url": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-2024", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "ENISA and Verizon DBIR highlight persistent basic hygiene failures, exploitation of known vulnerabilities and uneven implementation of best practices across sectors, suggesting governance and institutional shortcomings are major drivers of systemic cyber risk." }, "cyber.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.0381, "lo": 0.0223, "hi": 0.045, "source": "2024 Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon, 2024", "url": "https://www.verizon.com/business/resources/reports/2024-dbir-executive-summary.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (1/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 0.055, 0.045) under growth kind 'incident_reporting_growth'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: Summaries of Verizon’s 2024 DBIR report that it analyzed 30,458 incidents and 10,626 confirmed breaches—nearly double the prior year—indicating roughly 100% year‑over‑year growth in confirmed breaches, so mu is set near 1.0 with a wide range. [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=event_frequency_growth; raw_indicator_growth=1; risk_conversion=0.054967; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "event_frequency_growth", "risk_conversion": 0.054967, "raw_indicator_growth": 1.0, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 1/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 0.054967, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "cyber.threshold": { "mu": 8.4, "lo": 7.7, "hi": 9.1, "source": "Expert judgment based on ENISA and Verizon DBIR impact assessments", "url": "", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "expert_judgment", "note": "Given that large‑scale coordinated attacks on critical infrastructure and data could cause severe but often partly recoverable damage, the catastrophe threshold is placed slightly below climate and nuclear anchors with substantial uncertainty." }, "autonomousw.scale": { "mu": 4.0, "lo": 3.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "ICRC, \"Autonomous weapons\" (2023); Human Rights Watch, \"A Hazard to Human Rights: Autonomous Weapons Systems and Digital Decision-Making\" (2025)", "url": "https://www.icrc.org/en/law-and-policy/autonomous-weapons", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "ICRC and Human Rights Watch describe autonomous weapons as an immediate humanitarian concern that could cause widespread, large‑scale harm to civilians and human rights across many conflicts." }, "autonomousw.urgency": { "mu": 4.0, "lo": 3.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "ICRC, \"Autonomous weapons\" (2023); ICRC First Committee Working Paper on autonomous weapons (2025)", "url": "https://www.icrc.org/en/law-and-policy/autonomous-weapons", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "The ICRC characterizes autonomous weapons as an immediate cause of humanitarian concern and urges states to adopt new, legally binding rules without delay, indicating high policy urgency." }, "autonomousw.acceleration": { "mu": 4.0, "lo": 3.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "SIPRI, \"Mapping the Development of Autonomy in Weapon Systems\" (2017); UN CCW GGE on LAWS reports 2014–2023", "url": "https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/resource/mapping-the-development-of-autonomy-in-weapons-systems/", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "SIPRI’s mapping study and successive CCW GGE reports describe a steady and rapid expansion of autonomy in weapon systems and increasing deployment in recent conflicts, suggesting fast acceleration." }, "autonomousw.interdependence": { "mu": 4.0, "lo": 3.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "SIPRI AI and military applications programme; Human Rights Watch (2025) report on autonomous weapons and digital decision‑making", "url": "https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/emerging-military-and-security-technologies/artificial-intelligence", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Analyses highlight that autonomous weapons are being integrated into wider military AI, surveillance, cyber and command‑and‑control systems, so failures or escalation can interact with nuclear, cyber and conventional domains." }, "autonomousw.irreversibility": { "mu": 3.0, "lo": 2.0, "hi": 4.0, "source": "ICRC policy papers on autonomous weapons; UN discussions on LAWS in CCW and UNGA", "url": "https://www.icrc.org/en/law-and-policy/autonomous-weapons", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "ICRC and UN documents warn that widespread diffusion of autonomous weapons could entrench an AI‑driven arms race and lower thresholds for force use, but also note that binding rules could still limit deployment." }, "autonomousw.gov_failure": { "mu": 4.0, "lo": 3.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "CCW GGE on LAWS reports (2014–2023); UNGA LAWS resolution debates; Stop Killer Robots campaign updates", "url": "https://dig.watch/processes/gge-laws", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "After a decade of CCW GGE discussions there is still no legally binding treaty on LAWS, despite growing UNGA support for regulation and civil‑society calls for prohibitions, indicating substantial governance gaps." }, "autonomousw.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.0238, "lo": 0.0122, "hi": 0.0393, "source": "Allied Market Research, \"Autonomous Weapons Market\" (CAGR 10.4% 2020–2030); Strategic Market Research, \"Automated Weapon System Market\" (CAGR 6.8% 2024–2030); TechSci Research, \"Autonomous Military Weapons Market\" (CAGR 12.51% 2024–2030)", "url": "https://www.alliedmarketresearch.com/press-release/autonomous-weapons-market.html", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "anchored_judgment", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (0.1/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 0.25, 0.04) under growth kind 'market_capability_growth'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: Industry forecasts for autonomous and automated military weapons markets cluster around compound annual growth of roughly 7–13%, used here as a proxy for growth in deployed autonomous weapon systems. [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=capability_growth; raw_indicator_growth=0.1; risk_conversion=0.249711; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "capability_growth", "risk_conversion": 0.249711, "raw_indicator_growth": 0.1, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 0.1/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 0.249711, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "autonomousw.threshold": { "mu": 8.5, "lo": 7.8, "hi": 9.2, "source": "Expert judgment based on ICRC, HRW and UN assessments of escalation, attribution and humanitarian risks from large‑scale LAWS deployment", "url": "", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "expert_judgment", "note": "Given warnings that autonomous weapons could destabilize deterrence, enable speed‑of‑machine escalation and cause large‑scale civilian harm, their systemic risk threshold is set just below nuclear but above most other emerging threats." }, "minerals.scale": { "mu": 4.0, "lo": 3.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "IEA, Critical Minerals Market Review 2023; IEA, Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2024; USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025", "url": "https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/c7716240-ab4f-4f5d-b138-291e76c6a7c7/CriticalMineralsMarketReview2023.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "IEA shows that markets for energy‑transition minerals doubled between 2017 and 2022 and that several minerals face high supply‑risk ratings, while USGS reports persistent high import dependence for many critical inputs, implying large global economic and climate‑transition stakes." }, "minerals.urgency": { "mu": 4.0, "lo": 3.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "IEA, Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2024; IEA, Critical Minerals Market Review 2023", "url": "https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ee01701d-1d5c-4ba8-9df6-abeeac9de99a/GlobalCriticalMineralsOutlook2024.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "IEA warns that surging near‑term demand for lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite and rare earths for clean energy could outpace supply and create bottlenecks this decade without rapid investment and diversification." }, "minerals.acceleration": { "mu": 4.0, "lo": 3.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "IEA, Critical Minerals Market Review 2023; IEA, Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2024", "url": "https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/c7716240-ab4f-4f5d-b138-291e76c6a7c7/CriticalMineralsMarketReview2023.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "From 2017 to 2022 lithium demand tripled, cobalt demand rose about 70% and nickel demand about 40%, and the overall market value of energy‑transition minerals doubled, indicating rapid acceleration." }, "minerals.interdependence": { "mu": 4.0, "lo": 3.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook; USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025; World Bank and OECD analyses of minerals for climate action", "url": "https://pubs.usgs.gov/publication/mcs2025", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "Critical minerals supply chains link mining, refining, clean‑energy deployment, defense and high‑tech manufacturing, so disruptions or weaponized export controls can cascade through energy, economic and geopolitical systems." }, "minerals.irreversibility": { "mu": 3.0, "lo": 2.0, "hi": 4.0, "source": "IEA and World Bank reports on mining impacts and lock‑in; USGS long‑term resource assessments", "url": "https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ee01701d-1d5c-4ba8-9df6-abeeac9de99a/GlobalCriticalMineralsOutlook2024.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "While new deposits and technologies can eventually ease bottlenecks, underinvestment and environmentally damaging mining in the 2020s could lock in higher costs, local ecological harm and delayed decarbonization pathways for decades." }, "minerals.gov_failure": { "mu": 3.5, "lo": 3.0, "hi": 4.5, "source": "IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook; USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025; analyses of the EU Critical Raw Materials Act", "url": "https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ee01701d-1d5c-4ba8-9df6-abeeac9de99a/GlobalCriticalMineralsOutlook2024.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Major economies are only beginning to implement strategies like the EU Critical Raw Materials Act, while IEA and USGS still highlight high concentration in countries such as China and the DRC and limited recycling, indicating partial but insufficient governance progress." }, "minerals.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.0307, "lo": 0.0159, "hi": 0.04, "source": "IEA, Critical Minerals Market Review 2023 (market doubled 2017–2022); IEA, Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2024; Mining Weekly summary of IEA data", "url": "https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/c7716240-ab4f-4f5d-b138-291e76c6a7c7/CriticalMineralsMarketReview2023.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (0.15/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 0.22, 0.04) under growth kind 'market_demand_growth'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: IEA reports that the market for key energy‑transition minerals doubled over five years (implying a compound annual growth rate of roughly 15%) and that lithium, cobalt and nickel demand have risen strongly over 2017–2022. [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=market_growth; raw_indicator_growth=0.15; risk_conversion=0.219659; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "market_growth", "risk_conversion": 0.219659, "raw_indicator_growth": 0.15, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 0.15/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 0.219659, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "minerals.threshold": { "mu": 8.0, "lo": 7.3, "hi": 8.7, "source": "Expert judgment informed by IEA and USGS assessments of climate‑transition bottlenecks and geopolitical supply risks", "url": "", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "expert_judgment", "note": "Because critical minerals bottlenecks can seriously slow decarbonization and trigger severe economic and geopolitical shocks but are somewhat more manageable and reversible than nuclear or extreme climate risks, the threshold is set moderately high but below climate and nuclear anchors." }, "space.scale": { "mu": 4.5, "lo": 4.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "ESA Space Environment Reports 2024–2025; OECD, \"Earth’s Orbits at Risk\" (2022); NOAA and other analyses of Carrington‑type solar storms", "url": "https://www.esa.int/Space_Safety/Space_Debris/ESA_Space_Environment_Report_2024", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "ESA and OECD warn that rapidly increasing debris and satellite congestion could eventually render key orbits unusable, while severe space‑weather or counterspace events could disrupt navigation, communications and power grids on a global scale." }, "space.urgency": { "mu": 4.0, "lo": 3.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "ESA Space Environment Reports; Secure World Foundation Global Counterspace Capabilities; NOAA Space Weather guidance", "url": "https://www.esa.int/Space_Safety/Space_Debris/ESA_Space_Environment_Report_2024", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "Recent ESA reports show tracked objects and major fragmentation events rising quickly, Secure World Foundation documents growing counterspace capabilities, and NOAA highlights that a Carrington‑scale storm could cause trillions in damage, all pointing to high near‑term urgency." }, "space.acceleration": { "mu": 4.5, "lo": 4.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "ESA Space Environment Reports; Space Foundation, \"The Space Report 2023 Q4\"; Polish Economic Institute and Polish Space Agency report on satellite launches", "url": "https://www.spacefoundation.org/2024/01/23/the-space-report-2023-q4/", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "ESA and Space Foundation record record‑high launches and thousands of new payloads per year, and one study finds the number of satellites launched in 2023 was 1 170% higher than in 2013 with roughly 50% average annual growth in launches since 2016." }, "space.interdependence": { "mu": 5.0, "lo": 4.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "OECD, \"Earth’s Orbits at Risk\"; ESA and UNOOSA space‑debris guidelines; Secure World Foundation space‑security reports", "url": "https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/09/earth-s-orbits-at-risk_d8902e97/16543990-en.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "OECD, ESA and SWF emphasize that space infrastructure underpins communications, navigation, timing, weather and financial systems, so major disruption in key orbits would cascade through almost all modern economic and security domains." }, "space.irreversibility": { "mu": 4.5, "lo": 4.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "OECD, \"Earth’s Orbits at Risk\"; ESA Space Debris FAQ; National Academies assessment of orbital debris evolution", "url": "https://www.esa.int/Space_Safety/Space_Debris/Space_Debris_FAQ_Frequently_asked_questions", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "OECD and ESA warn that debris density could reach a tipping point where cascading collisions (Kessler syndrome) make valuable orbits unusable for generations, making large‑scale debris growth effectively irreversible on human time scales." }, "space.gov_failure": { "mu": 4.5, "lo": 4.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "UN COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines; ESA Space Debris FAQ; Secure World Foundation space‑security and counterspace reports", "url": "https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/st_space_49E.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "UN COPUOS guidelines on debris mitigation and long‑term sustainability are non‑binding and implementation is uneven, while SWF and ESA note continued growth in debris and counterspace capabilities and stalled multilateral progress, indicating serious governance shortcomings." }, "space.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.0328, "lo": 0.0172, "hi": 0.04, "source": "ESA Space Environment Report 2025 (tracked objects +7 473 in 2024 to 39 246 total); ESA 2024 report (~35 000 tracked objects); Earth & I summary of ESA data", "url": "https://www.theearthandi.org/post/2025-space-environment-report", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (0.2/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 0.18, 0.04) under growth kind 'inventory_growth_proxy'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: ESA data indicate that the number of tracked objects in orbit grew by about 24% between 2023 and 2024 (from roughly 31 800 to 39 246), and tracked populations have risen from ~35 000 to about 40 000 in a few years, consistent with an order‑of‑magnitude annual growth rate around 20%. [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=indicator_growth; raw_indicator_growth=0.2; risk_conversion=0.179902; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "indicator_growth", "risk_conversion": 0.179902, "raw_indicator_growth": 0.2, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 0.2/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 0.179902, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "space.threshold": { "mu": 8.4, "lo": 7.7, "hi": 9.1, "source": "Expert judgment informed by ESA, OECD, SWF and NOAA assessments of Kessler‑syndrome, counterspace conflict and extreme space‑weather risks to critical infrastructure", "url": "", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "expert_judgment", "note": "Because runaway debris growth, hostile counterspace operations or a Carrington‑scale solar storm could severely degrade satellite‑based services and critical infrastructure worldwide but are somewhat less immediate than full‑scale nuclear war, the systemic risk threshold is set high but slightly below nuclear and close to climate risk anchors." }, "geopolitics.scale": { "mu": 4.6, "lo": 4.0, "hi": 4.9, "source": "SIPRI 'Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2024'; UCDP 'Organized violence 1989–2024'", "url": "https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-04/2504_fs_milex_2024.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "Global military expenditure reached about 2718 billion dollars in 2024, up 9.4 percent in real terms and capping a decade of continuous growth. UCDP data show 61 active state-based conflicts in 2024, the highest number since records began, underscoring a very large scale of organized violence." }, "geopolitics.urgency": { "mu": 4.7, "lo": 4.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "SIPRI military expenditure fact sheets 2023–2024; UCDP 2024 conflict statistics", "url": "https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/2404_fs_milex_2023.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "Steep year-on-year rises in military spending since 2022 and a record number of ongoing wars indicate that escalation pressures are acute in the present decade rather than hypothetical long-term risks." }, "geopolitics.acceleration": { "mu": 4.3, "lo": 3.5, "hi": 4.8, "source": "SIPRI 'Trends in World Military Expenditure' 2023–2024; UCDP 'Organized violence 1989–2024'", "url": "https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-04/2504_fs_milex_2024.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "The 9.4 percent jump in global military spending in 2024 was the sharpest since at least the late 1980s, following a 6.8 percent increase in 2023, and interstate conflicts have become more common since 2016." }, "geopolitics.interdependence": { "mu": 4.4, "lo": 3.7, "hi": 4.9, "source": "Munich Security Report 2025: Multipolarization", "url": "https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2025/", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "The Munich Security Report 2025 argues that multipolarization and contestation between competing order models are already obstructing joint responses to climate change, nuclear risks and other systemic threats, indicating strong coupling between geopolitical competition and other global risks." }, "geopolitics.irreversibility": { "mu": 3.8, "lo": 3.0, "hi": 4.5, "source": "Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), 2025: Organized Violence 1989–2024.", "url": "https://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1995067/FULLTEXT01.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "UCDP finds that few conflicts are resolved and that no war active in 2023 fell below the war threshold in 2024, suggesting that once large-scale wars start they tend to persist for years." }, "geopolitics.gov_failure": { "mu": 4.2, "lo": 3.4, "hi": 4.8, "source": "UN Security Council 2023 agenda press release; Munich Security Report 2025", "url": "https://reliefweb.int/report/world/wars-gaza-ukraine-dominate-security-councils-2023-agenda-use-veto-proliferates-organs-ability", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "UN and Munich Security analyses highlight that widening divisions among major powers, proliferating vetoes and failures to prevent or resolve wars are eroding the effectiveness and credibility of existing security institutions." }, "geopolitics.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.0423, "lo": 0.0216, "hi": 0.045, "source": "SIPRI 'Trends in World Military Expenditure' 2023 and 2024", "url": "https://www.sipri.org/publications/2024/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-world-military-expenditure-2023", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (0.08/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 0.55, 0.045) under growth kind 'spending_conflict_pressure'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: SIPRI reports that world military expenditure rose 6.8 percent in real terms in 2023 and a further 9.4 percent in 2024, so I approximate an underlying annual growth rate of order eight percent for conflict-driven armament. [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=indicator_growth; raw_indicator_growth=0.08; risk_conversion=0.549629; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "indicator_growth", "risk_conversion": 0.549629, "raw_indicator_growth": 0.08, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 0.08/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 0.549629, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "geopolitics.threshold": { "mu": 9.0, "lo": 8.3, "hi": 9.7, "source": "Munich Security Report 2025; SIPRI conflict and spending data", "url": "https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2025/", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "anchored_judgment", "note": "Given record-high spending and conflict counts but still-functioning great-power deterrence, I place the systemic breakdown threshold for geopolitical escalation slightly below the nuclear war threshold yet well above current conditions, as a structured expert judgment anchored in these trends." }, "supply.scale": { "mu": 3.8, "lo": 3.0, "hi": 4.4, "source": "World Bank Logistics Performance Index 2023; OECD 'Risks and Resilience in Global Trade'", "url": "https://lpi.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/LPI_2023_report_with_layout.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "The 2023 Logistics Performance Index finds that, despite severe disruptions during 2020–22, global logistics systems have remained broadly resilient, though port and corridor delays remain significant worldwide. OECD work on trade after multiple shocks emphasizes persistent bottlenecks and high but volatile energy and commodity prices, pointing to substantial though not existential supply-chain stress." }, "supply.urgency": { "mu": 3.9, "lo": 3.1, "hi": 4.5, "source": "OECD 'International trade in the wake of multiple shocks'; IMF and ECB analyses of supply chain pressures", "url": "https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2023/11/international-trade-in-the-wake-of-multiple-shocks_b3774c1e-en.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "Recent OECD and IMF analyses warn that the accumulation of geopolitical shocks, extreme weather events and protectionist measures is already stressing global value chains and can quickly transmit disruptions into inflation and output losses." }, "supply.acceleration": { "mu": 2.8, "lo": 2.0, "hi": 3.6, "source": "IMF Working Paper 2023/039; ECB paper on global supply chain pressures", "url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2023/02/24/global-supply-chain-disruptions-challenges-for-inflation-and-monetary-policy-in-sub-saharan-africa-529983", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Indicators such as the Global Supply Chain Pressure Index, as summarized in IMF and ECB research, show that pandemic-era supply pressures have eased from their 2021 peak even as structural climate and geopolitical risks continue to build." }, "supply.interdependence": { "mu": 4.6, "lo": 4.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "World Bank LPI 2023; OECD 'Strengthening economic resilience within global value chains'", "url": "https://lpi.worldbank.org/international/tracking-data", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "The LPI and OECD resilience reports stress that modern production depends on complex multi-country logistics and just-in-time networks, meaning disruptions in a few hubs can cascade globally." }, "supply.irreversibility": { "mu": 3.3, "lo": 2.5, "hi": 4.0, "source": "OECD 'Strengthening economic resilience within global value chains'; IMF and OECD work on climate and supply chains", "url": "https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/05/strengthening-economic-resilience-within-global-value-chains-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean_8a269df9-en.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "OECD studies on resilience in global value chains highlight that infrastructure damage, decarbonization lock-in and climate-driven hazards can create long-lasting constraints, even though firms can reconfigure sourcing over time." }, "supply.gov_failure": { "mu": 3.5, "lo": 2.7, "hi": 4.3, "source": "OECD trade-shocks and resilience reports; OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index updates", "url": "https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/risks-and-resilience-in-global-trade_c8a001ff-en.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Policy responses have been mixed, with some governments investing in resilience and diversification while others increase trade barriers and ad hoc export controls that exacerbate vulnerabilities." }, "supply.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.0283, "lo": 0.0146, "hi": 0.04, "source": "OECD 'Strengthening economic resilience within global value chains', trade-restrictive measures coverage", "url": "https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/05/strengthening-economic-resilience-within-global-value-chains-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean_8a269df9-en.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (0.12/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 0.25, 0.04) under growth kind 'trade_restriction_growth'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: OECD reports that trade-restrictive measures affecting imports rose from covering less than 1 percent of imports in 2009 to over 9 percent in 2022, implying a sustained double-digit annual increase in this proxy for policy-driven supply-chain fragility. [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=indicator_growth; raw_indicator_growth=0.12; risk_conversion=0.249716; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "indicator_growth", "risk_conversion": 0.249716, "raw_indicator_growth": 0.12, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 0.12/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 0.249716, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "supply.threshold": { "mu": 8.5, "lo": 7.8, "hi": 9.2, "source": "World Bank LPI 2023; OECD resilience-in-GVCs analysis", "url": "https://lpi.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/LPI_2023_report_with_layout.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "anchored_judgment", "note": "Because supply chains have demonstrated significant adaptive capacity since the pandemic yet remain exposed to concentrated chokepoints and climate shocks, I place the systemic breakdown threshold somewhat below that for climate and nuclear risks but still high, reflecting structured expert judgment anchored in these studies." }, "fragmentation_gov.scale": { "mu": 4.1, "lo": 3.3, "hi": 4.7, "source": "UN Secretary-General 'Our Common Agenda'; UNESCO 'Fragmenting consensus' on global education governance", "url": "https://www.un.org/en/content/common-agenda-report/", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "The UN Secretary-General’s 'Our Common Agenda' describes the world as being at an inflection point and stresses that multilateral mechanisms are struggling to deliver on shared goals, while only about 18 percent of SDG targets remain on track." }, "fragmentation_gov.urgency": { "mu": 4.3, "lo": 3.6, "hi": 4.9, "source": "UN Security Council 2023 agenda press release; General Assembly debates on the veto initiative", "url": "https://press.un.org/en/2024/ga12593.doc.htm", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "General Assembly debates on the veto initiative and Security Council paralysis emphasize that proliferating vetoes and deadlock are already undermining responses to active crises in Gaza, Ukraine, Myanmar, Sudan and elsewhere." }, "fragmentation_gov.acceleration": { "mu": 4.0, "lo": 3.2, "hi": 4.6, "source": "UN Security Council and General Assembly press on veto use 2022–2024", "url": "https://reliefweb.int/report/world/wars-gaza-ukraine-dominate-security-councils-2023-agenda-use-veto-proliferates-organs-ability", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "UN reporting notes that eight resolutions and one amendment were vetoed between 2023 and early 2024, and 2023 saw a ten-year low in Security Council resolutions adopted, indicating a worsening trend in Council effectiveness." }, "fragmentation_gov.interdependence": { "mu": 4.5, "lo": 3.8, "hi": 4.9, "source": "Munich Security Report 2025: Multipolarization", "url": "https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2025/", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "The Munich Security Report 2025 argues that negative effects of multipolarity are prevailing as divides between major powers obstruct cooperative action on climate, security and economic instability, showing that governance fragmentation amplifies many other global threats." }, "fragmentation_gov.irreversibility": { "mu": 3.7, "lo": 3.0, "hi": 4.3, "source": "UNESCO 'Fragmenting consensus'; Munich Security Report 2025", "url": "https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/fragmenting-consensus-multipolar-turn-global-education-governance", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Erosion of trust in multilateral institutions and the emergence of rival governance blocs in areas such as education and trade suggest that, while reforms are possible, rebuilding cohesive global governance will likely be slow once fragmentation has advanced." }, "fragmentation_gov.gov_failure": { "mu": 4.6, "lo": 4.0, "hi": 5.0, "source": "UN 'Our Common Agenda'; UN Foundation brief on multilateralism; Munich Security Report 2025", "url": "https://unfoundation.org/our-common-agenda/", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "UN and Munich Security documents both stress that without substantial reforms, the international system risks sliding toward chronic paralysis in the face of cross-border crises, reflecting a high degree of systemic governance failure." }, "fragmentation_gov.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.0336, "lo": 0.0182, "hi": 0.04, "source": "UN Security Council and General Assembly press on rising veto use 2022–2024", "url": "https://press.un.org/en/2024/ga12593.doc.htm", "accessed": "2026-04-25", "strength": "anchored_judgment", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (0.4/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 0.1, 0.04) under growth kind 'small_count_institutional_proxy'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: UN press reports show that Security Council veto use increased from four vetoes in 2022 to six in 2023 and that eight resolutions or amendments were vetoed between 2023 and early 2024, implying a large recent fractional rise in deadlock frequency. [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=indicator_growth; raw_indicator_growth=0.4; risk_conversion=0.09986; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "indicator_growth", "risk_conversion": 0.09986, "raw_indicator_growth": 0.4, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 0.4/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 0.09986, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "fragmentation_gov.threshold": { "mu": 9.1, "lo": 8.4, "hi": 9.7, "source": "Munich Security Report 2025; UN governance reform debates", "url": "https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2025/", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "anchored_judgment", "note": "Given that multilateral institutions still function in many domains yet face sharply rising paralysis on hard security and global commons issues, I place the breakdown threshold for global governance fragmentation slightly above that for geopolitical escalation, based on structured expert judgment anchored in these trends." }, "economic.scale": { "mu": 4.3, "lo": 3.7, "hi": 4.8, "source": "IMF Global Financial Stability Report, October 2024; BIS Annual Economic Report 2025; World Bank Global Economic Prospects, June 2025.", "url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/gfsr/issues/2024/10/22/global-financial-stability-report-october-2024", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "IMF and World Bank flagships describe contained near-term financial stability risks but rising vulnerabilities and a historically weak global growth outlook, implying that a major financial shock could have very large worldwide economic impacts." }, "economic.urgency": { "mu": 3.6, "lo": 3.0, "hi": 4.2, "source": "IMF Global Financial Stability Report, October 2024; World Bank Global Economic Prospects, June 2025.", "url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/gfsr/issues/2024/10/22/global-financial-stability-report-october-2024", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "IMF assesses near‑term financial stability risks at roughly mid‑historical levels while warning that elevated macroeconomic uncertainty and geopolitical risks could quickly tighten conditions, suggesting moderate‑to‑high urgency for preventive action." }, "economic.acceleration": { "mu": 3.4, "lo": 2.8, "hi": 4.0, "source": "IMF Global Financial Stability Report, October 2024; BIS Annual Economic Report 2025.", "url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/gfsr/issues/2024/10/22/global-financial-stability-report-october-2024", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Both IMF and BIS highlight that structural vulnerabilities—high debt, non‑bank leverage, and financial market interconnectedness—are building over time rather than suddenly, implying a steadily rising but not yet explosive risk trajectory." }, "economic.interdependence": { "mu": 4.5, "lo": 4.0, "hi": 4.9, "source": "IMF Global Financial Stability Report, October 2024; BIS Annual Economic Report 2025; World Bank Global Economic Prospects, June 2025.", "url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/gfsr/issues/2024/10/22/global-financial-stability-report-october-2024", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Global reports emphasize that trade fragmentation, debt vulnerabilities, and capital‑flow shocks interact through tightly linked financial markets and cross‑border spillovers, indicating very high interdependence with other macro and geopolitical risks." }, "economic.irreversibility": { "mu": 3.3, "lo": 2.7, "hi": 3.9, "source": "World Bank Global Economic Prospects, June 2025; BIS Annual Economic Report 2025.", "url": "https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/8bf0b62ec6bcb886d97295ad930059e9-0050012025/original/GEP-June-2025.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Analyses of past crises and current outlooks stress lasting output and productivity scars from financial disruptions, but also show that growth can eventually recover with strong policy, suggesting partly but not fully reversible damage." }, "economic.gov_failure": { "mu": 4.1, "lo": 3.5, "hi": 4.7, "source": "IMF Global Financial Stability Report, October 2024; BIS Annual Economic Report 2025.", "url": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/gfsr/issues/2024/10/22/global-financial-stability-report-october-2024", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Both IMF and BIS argue that policy choices on fiscal consolidation, financial regulation, and trade are critical to containing vulnerabilities, implying that governance failures could strongly magnify the probability and severity of systemic crises." }, "economic.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.0149, "lo": 0.0075, "hi": 0.0252, "source": "Expert judgment based on qualitative trends in financial stress indices and macro‑financial vulnerability assessments.", "url": "", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "anchored_judgment", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (0.015/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 1, 0.03) under growth kind 'expert_systemic_fragility_proxy'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: No single quantitative series cleanly tracks long‑run global financial‑system fragility, so this growth rate is an expert judgment calibrated to reflect a slow upward drift in underlying systemic risk consistent with major flagship assessments. [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=expert_mapping; raw_indicator_growth=0.015; risk_conversion=1; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "expert_mapping", "risk_conversion": 1.0, "raw_indicator_growth": 0.015, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 0.015/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 1, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "economic.threshold": { "mu": 8.6, "lo": 8.0, "hi": 9.2, "source": "Expert judgment on tipping‑point conditions for a globally systemic financial fracture.", "url": "", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "expert_judgment", "note": "Threshold is set to reflect the level at which combined debt overhang, market stress and policy missteps could plausibly trigger a crisis on the scale of the global financial crisis or worse, higher than typical recessions but below nuclear war." }, "debt.scale": { "mu": 4.4, "lo": 3.8, "hi": 4.9, "source": "IMF Global Debt Monitor 2024; UNCTAD A World of Debt 2025; World Bank International Debt Report 2024.", "url": "https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/GDD/2024%20Global%20Debt%20Monitor.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "IMF and UNCTAD report global public debt around or above 90–100 percent of world GDP and at a record nominal level of about 102 trillion dollars, with many developing countries in or near distress, implying very large potential systemic damage if a cascade occurs." }, "debt.urgency": { "mu": 3.9, "lo": 3.3, "hi": 4.5, "source": "World Bank International Debt Report 2024; UNCTAD A World of Debt 2025.", "url": "https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/12/03/developing-countries-paid-record-1-4-trillion-on-foreign-debt-in-2023", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "World Bank and UNCTAD highlight that developing countries paid a record 1.4 trillion dollars in external debt service in 2023 and that dozens spend over 10 percent of revenues on interest, indicating high near‑term urgency to address sovereign debt risks." }, "debt.acceleration": { "mu": 3.8, "lo": 3.2, "hi": 4.4, "source": "UNCTAD A World of Debt 2025; IMF Global Debt Monitor 2024; World Bank International Debt Report 2024.", "url": "https://unctad.org/publication/world-of-debt", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "UNCTAD finds public debt in developing countries has grown roughly twice as fast as in advanced economies since 2010, while IMF and World Bank data show renewed increases in global public‑debt ratios and external debt stocks, suggesting a brisk upward trajectory." }, "debt.interdependence": { "mu": 4.6, "lo": 4.1, "hi": 4.9, "source": "IMF Global Debt Monitor 2024; BIS Annual Economic Report 2025; World Bank Global Economic Prospects, June 2025.", "url": "https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/GDD/2024%20Global%20Debt%20Monitor.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "High and rising sovereign debt interacts with tighter global financial conditions, non‑bank exposures and weaker growth, so stress in one set of bond markets can rapidly spill over to others through common investors and currency channels." }, "debt.irreversibility": { "mu": 3.7, "lo": 3.1, "hi": 4.3, "source": "IMF and World Bank analyses of past debt crises; UNCTAD A World of Debt 2025.", "url": "https://unctad.org/publication/world-of-debt", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Historical work on sovereign crises and current UNCTAD analysis emphasize that debt overhangs impose long‑lasting growth and development losses, though restructurings and reforms can eventually restore sustainability, implying significant but not total irreversibility." }, "debt.gov_failure": { "mu": 4.4, "lo": 3.8, "hi": 4.9, "source": "UNCTAD A World of Debt 2025; World Bank International Debt Report 2024; IMF Global Debt Monitor 2024.", "url": "https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/debt-statistics/idr/products", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "UNCTAD and World Bank stress that inadequate fiscal adjustment, weak debt management and slow progress on restructuring are major drivers of the current debt crisis in many countries, indicating strong dependence on governance and policy coordination." }, "debt.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.0131, "lo": 0.0066, "hi": 0.0218, "source": "International Monetary Fund, 2024: Global Debt Monitor 2024.", "url": "https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/GDD/2024%20Global%20Debt%20Monitor.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-25", "strength": "moderate", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (0.022/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 0.6, 0.03) under growth kind 'macro_balance_proxy'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: Annual growth rate is approximated from the increase in global public debt‑to‑GDP from about 92 to 94 percent between 2022 and 2023, implying roughly 2.2 percent fractional growth in the ratio per year. [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=indicator_growth; raw_indicator_growth=0.022; risk_conversion=0.601981; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "indicator_growth", "risk_conversion": 0.601981, "raw_indicator_growth": 0.022, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 0.022/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 0.601981, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "debt.threshold": { "mu": 8.7, "lo": 8.1, "hi": 9.3, "source": "Expert judgment on conditions for a cascading sovereign debt and bond‑market crisis.", "url": "", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "expert_judgment", "note": "Threshold reflects the level at which combined global public‑debt ratios, refinancing pressures and market contagion could plausibly trigger widespread sovereign defaults and bond‑market dysfunction, roughly comparable in severity to the largest historical debt waves." }, "displacement.scale": { "mu": 4.2, "lo": 3.6, "hi": 4.8, "source": "UNHCR Global Trends: Forced Displacement 2023 and 2024; IDMC Global Report on Internal Displacement 2024 and 2025; World Bank Groundswell report.", "url": "https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4051778?v=pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "UNHCR reports that forcibly displaced people reached about 117.3 million at end‑2023 and around 123.2 million by end‑2024, while IDMC finds more than 80 million people living in internal displacement by 2024, indicating an already massive and growing global scale." }, "displacement.urgency": { "mu": 4.3, "lo": 3.7, "hi": 4.9, "source": "UNHCR Global Trends 2023/2024; IDMC GRID 2024/2025; World Bank Groundswell report.", "url": "https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2025/", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "UNHCR and IDMC show record‑high displacement that continues to rise year‑on‑year, and the World Bank projects that climate impacts could create up to 216 million internal climate migrants by 2050 without decisive action, pointing to very high current urgency." }, "displacement.acceleration": { "mu": 4.5, "lo": 4.0, "hi": 4.9, "source": "IDMC Global Report on Internal Displacement 2024 and 2025; UNHCR Global Trends 2023; World Bank Groundswell report.", "url": "https://reliefweb.int/report/world/2024-global-report-internal-displacement-enarrusv", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "IDMC reports that the number of people living in internal displacement grew by about 50 percent over five years to 75.9 million in 2023 and then to 83.4 million in 2024, while UNHCR’s forced‑displacement totals rise each year, indicating strongly accelerating trends." }, "displacement.interdependence": { "mu": 4.4, "lo": 3.8, "hi": 4.9, "source": "UNHCR Global Trends; IDMC GRID; World Bank Groundswell and related analyses.", "url": "https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2021/09/13/millions-on-the-move-in-their-own-countries-the-human-face-of-climate-change", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "Global reports stress that conflict, economic fragility and climate change jointly drive displacement and that large movements in turn strain urban systems, stability and development, showing very high interdependence with security, economic and ecological risks." }, "displacement.irreversibility": { "mu": 3.9, "lo": 3.3, "hi": 4.5, "source": "UNHCR Global Trends; IDMC GRID; World Bank Groundswell report.", "url": "https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-trends-forced-displacement-2024-enar", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Evidence from UNHCR and IDMC shows that many displacement situations last for years or decades and climate‑driven movements may be effectively permanent, though some returns and local integrations do occur, implying substantial but not total irreversibility." }, "displacement.gov_failure": { "mu": 4.2, "lo": 3.6, "hi": 4.8, "source": "UNHCR and IDMC analyses of drivers of protracted displacement; World Bank Groundswell report.", "url": "https://reliefweb.int/report/world/2025-global-report-internal-displacement-enarsenode", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Reports emphasize that weak governance, conflict management failures, inadequate planning and lack of investment in adaptation greatly worsen displacement risks and prolong crises, even though biophysical climate shocks also play a major role." }, "displacement.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.0366, "lo": 0.0185, "hi": 0.04, "source": "UNHCR, 2024–2025: Global Trends reports for 2023 and 2024.", "url": "https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4051778?v=pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (0.05/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 0.75, 0.04) under growth kind 'exposed_population_growth'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: Annual growth rate is approximated from the increase in total forcibly displaced people from about 117.3 million at end‑2023 to roughly 123.2 million at end‑2024, implying around 5 percent year‑on‑year growth in the stock of displaced persons. [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=event_frequency_growth; raw_indicator_growth=0.05; risk_conversion=0.750151; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "event_frequency_growth", "risk_conversion": 0.750151, "raw_indicator_growth": 0.05, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 0.05/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 0.750151, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "displacement.threshold": { "mu": 7.9, "lo": 7.3, "hi": 8.5, "source": "Expert judgment on conditions for displacement to overwhelm receiving‑state capacity at scale.", "url": "", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "expert_judgment", "note": "Threshold is calibrated to the point where compounding conflict and climate migration flows would plausibly exceed the absorptive capacity of key transit and destination regions, risking systemic governance failures without matching investment and cooperation." }, "authoritarian.scale": { "mu": 4.6, "lo": 4.2, "hi": 4.9, "source": "V-Dem Democracy Report 2025–2026 and related summaries showing that roughly 71–74% of the world’s population now lives in autocracies and that autocracies outnumber democracies.", "url": "https://www.v-dem.net/documents/60/V-dem-dr__2025_lowres.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "Because a clear majority of the world’s population now resides in autocratic or autocratizing regimes and the number of autocracies exceeds democracies by country count, overall scale is rated very high." }, "authoritarian.urgency": { "mu": 4.3, "lo": 3.7, "hi": 4.8, "source": "Freedom House Freedom in the World 2025 and V-Dem/International IDEA trend analyses documenting around two decades of consecutive global freedom decline and ongoing democratic backsliding.", "url": "https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2025/global-freedom-20th-year-decline", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Freedom House reports a twentieth consecutive year of global freedom deterioration and V-Dem/International IDEA find no sign that the current wave of autocratization is cresting, so short‑term urgency is assessed as high." }, "authoritarian.acceleration": { "mu": 3.9, "lo": 3.2, "hi": 4.5, "source": "V-Dem third wave of autocratization analyses and International IDEA Global State of Democracy 2025 describing eight to nine consecutive years with more countries declining than improving on key democratic indicators.", "url": "https://www.idea.int/news/global-democracy-report-majority-countries-worsen-press-freedom-hits-50-year-low", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Democracy monitors describe a sustained, broad‑based deterioration—nine straight years with more countries backsliding than improving and record declines in freedoms—suggesting elevated but not yet runaway acceleration in authoritarian drift." }, "authoritarian.interdependence": { "mu": 4.2, "lo": 3.6, "hi": 4.8, "source": "V-Dem and International IDEA reports plus political science work on democratic backsliding linking autocratization with restrictions on media, civil society, rule of law, and disinformation dynamics.", "url": "https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/global-state-democracy-key-findings-and-new-data", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Analyses emphasize how autocratization proceeds via interconnected attacks on media freedom, civil society, courts, and information integrity, indicating strong interdependence with other political and epistemic risks." }, "authoritarian.irreversibility": { "mu": 4.4, "lo": 3.8, "hi": 4.9, "source": "V-Dem and Journal of Democracy work on entrenched competitive authoritarianism and long‑lasting democratic backsliding, where dismantled checks and balances and captured institutions prove difficult to restore.", "url": "https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/elections-without-democracy-the-rise-of-competitive-authoritarianism/", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Comparative research on competitive authoritarian regimes and the third wave of autocratization suggests that once institutions, media, and courts are captured, reversals are rare and slow, so irreversibility is rated very high." }, "authoritarian.gov_failure": { "mu": 4.1, "lo": 3.4, "hi": 4.7, "source": "V-Dem and International IDEA documentation that many governments themselves drive autocratization by weakening checks and balances, manipulating elections, and eroding civil liberties.", "url": "https://www.v-dem.net/documents/60/V-dem-dr__2025_lowres.pdf", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Because democratic backsliding is often initiated and sustained by incumbent governments through legalistic power‑consolidation strategies, the likelihood of effective self‑correction by governments is assessed as high failure risk." }, "authoritarian.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.0313, "lo": 0.0158, "hi": 0.04, "source": "V-Dem estimates of the share of the world’s population living in autocracies rising from about 48% roughly a decade ago to around 71–74% by the mid‑2020s.", "url": "https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/36317/autocracies-outnumber-democracies-for-the-first-time-in-20-years-v-dem/", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "strong", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (0.0399/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 0.8, 0.04) under growth kind 'population_share_proxy'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: Taking V-Dem’s increase in population living under autocracies from approximately 48% to about 71–74% over roughly ten years implies an annual fractional growth in autocracy population share of about 4%, with a range reflecting uncertainty in timing and estimates. [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=indicator_growth; raw_indicator_growth=0.0399; risk_conversion=0.800009; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "indicator_growth", "risk_conversion": 0.800009, "raw_indicator_growth": 0.0399, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 0.0399/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 0.800009, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "authoritarian.threshold": { "mu": 8.9, "lo": 8.2, "hi": 9.6, "source": "Expert judgment; no primary source.", "url": "", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "expert_judgment", "note": "Threshold reflects an expert‑judgment point at which entrenched global autocracy would severely constrain recovery of liberal democratic institutions, calibrated slightly above the climate benchmark and close to the nuclear benchmark." }, "epistemic.scale": { "mu": 4.1, "lo": 3.5, "hi": 4.7, "source": "Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2025, Edelman Trust Barometer, and Oxford Internet Institute computational propaganda inventories showing low trust in news, widespread concern about misinformation, and organized disinformation campaigns in 80+ countries.", "url": "https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2025", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Global trust in news hovers around 40% with majorities in many countries worried about fake news, while organized online disinformation campaigns are documented in over 80 countries, indicating large but not yet fully saturated global scale." }, "epistemic.urgency": { "mu": 4.4, "lo": 3.8, "hi": 4.9, "source": "Reuters Institute 2025, Edelman Trust Barometer 2025–2026, and Nature Human Behaviour reviews highlighting persistent low trust, high concern about online misinformation, and immediate impacts on politics, public health, and social cohesion.", "url": "https://www.edelman.com/trust/2025/trust-barometer", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "With trust in institutions and news stuck at historically low levels, majorities expressing anxiety about distinguishing real from fake information, and documented harms from misinformation, epistemic breakdown is judged as highly urgent." }, "epistemic.acceleration": { "mu": 4.5, "lo": 3.9, "hi": 4.9, "source": "Oxford Internet Institute findings on rapidly expanding computational propaganda operations and studies detecting AI‑generated content rising from low single digits to mid‑teens of online text within about two years.", "url": "https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/posts/industrialized-disinformation/", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "The number of countries running organized social‑media manipulation campaigns and the share of online text flagged as AI‑generated have both surged within a few years, indicating very high acceleration in epistemic risks." }, "epistemic.interdependence": { "mu": 4.3, "lo": 3.7, "hi": 4.8, "source": "V-Dem and International IDEA analyses plus Oxford Internet Institute and Nature Human Behaviour work linking disinformation, polarization, and media capture to democratic decline and broader governance failures.", "url": "https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-025-06067-1", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Research consistently finds that online misinformation, computational propaganda, and declining media freedom are tightly coupled with democratic backsliding, polarization, and institutional erosion, so epistemic breakdown is highly interdependent with other systemic risks." }, "epistemic.irreversibility": { "mu": 3.4, "lo": 2.8, "hi": 4.0, "source": "Studies on misinformation and trust showing that false beliefs and institutional distrust can persist for years but can sometimes be mitigated via interventions, regulation, and media reform.", "url": "https://ourworldindata.org/trust", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "weak", "note": "Evidence suggests entrenched misinformation and distrust can be sticky yet partially reversible with sustained countermeasures, so irreversibility is assessed as moderate rather than extreme." }, "epistemic.gov_failure": { "mu": 4.0, "lo": 3.3, "hi": 4.6, "source": "Oxford Internet Institute computational propaganda inventories showing many governments themselves sponsoring disinformation, alongside limited and uneven regulatory responses.", "url": "https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/posts/industrialized-disinformation/", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "Because numerous governments actively run or contract organized disinformation campaigns while effective regulation of online platforms and AI content lags, the probability of governmental failure to mitigate epistemic risks is judged high." }, "epistemic.growth_rate": { "mu": 0.0292, "lo": 0.0151, "hi": 0.04, "source": "Oxford Internet Institute’s 2020 Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation reporting an increase in countries with cyber‑troop disinformation operations from 70 to 81 in one year.", "url": "https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/posts/industrialized-disinformation/", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "moderate", "note": "v1.4 calibrated-compatible update: the original indicator growth (0.1571/yr central) is retained as the evidence anchor, but its direct use as a collapse-hazard growth rate is avoided. This entry now stores an effective systemic risk-growth proxy computed as min(log1p(indicator_growth) × 0.2, 0.04) under growth kind 'institutional_spread_proxy'. This makes the current single-file code read a calibrated value without requiring a parser update. Original note: The rise from 70 to 81 countries running organized social‑media manipulation campaigns in a single year implies an annual fractional growth rate of about 16% in the number of states deploying such disinformation tactics, with bounds reflecting uncertainty and potential undercounting. [v1.5 growth calibration: growth_kind=indicator_growth; raw_indicator_growth=0.1571; risk_conversion=0.200114; effective_growth_calibrated=True.]", "growth_kind": "indicator_growth", "risk_conversion": 0.200114, "raw_indicator_growth": 0.1571, "effective_growth_calibrated": true, "calibration_note": "v1.5 safe calibrated entry. The original v1.3 raw/proxy central growth was 0.1571/yr. This entry stores calibrated effective systemic risk-growth directly in mu/lo/hi, so patched code should not apply another conversion. Reference conversion if using raw mode: effective = clamp(log1p(raw) * 0.200114, 0.0005, 0.08)." }, "epistemic.threshold": { "mu": 8.4, "lo": 7.8, "hi": 9.0, "source": "Expert judgment; no primary source.", "url": "", "accessed": "2026-04-24", "strength": "expert_judgment", "note": "Threshold represents an expert‑judgment level at which pervasive disinformation, AI‑generated content, and institutional distrust would critically impair collective decision‑making and crisis response, calibrated somewhat below the authoritarian and nuclear benchmarks but above many other systemic risks." } }